Brexit Impact Tracker - 17 April 2021 – A Tale of Two Universes – Brexiteers versus reality

This has been an interesting week, rich in Brexit-related news, which marked the first 107 days since the end of the transition period. The week brought a continuous flow of stories about trade disruptions, job losses that employers blame partly on Brexit, and worries about the long-term impact of Brexit on trade.

 There were also many – mostly worrying – news stories about Northern Ireland (most notably that the British NI secretary rejecting calls for a meeting with the Irish government) and slightly more positive news on Lord Frost’s continuing negotiations with the EU over the Irish Sea border (which seem take us back to proposals that had been discussed and rejected during the pre-Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations).

 There have also been news about delays on the UK side with establishing the necessary governance structure under the TCA in particular the dispute resolution bodies; and the EU Parliament in turn refusing to set a date for ratifying the TCA (which is still only provisionally applied) over concerns of a lack of proper implementation by the UK side.

 On the other hand, on Tuesday, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) released data that showed that trade between the UK and the EU had bounce back by 46.6% between January and February 2021. These figures led to comments and interpretations in the press that perfectly illustrate the populist discourse that is still dominating the debate five years after the referendum. Indeed, the public sphere in Britain is currently dominated by a deep divide that seems to make a reasonable approach to the issues at hand impossible. These discursive strategies are important to understand and challenge, because they may very well undermine the functioning of British democracy for decades to come.

 The ‘teething problems hypothesis’

 This week, the Brexiteers latched on to the ONS figures and declared that Brexit is over (and has been a success)!  Indeed Brexiteers saw in the ONS trade figures for February confirmation of the ‘teething problems hypothesis’ which states that the unprecedented drop in trade between the UK and the EU in January was due to stockpiling ahead of Brexit and companies and border posts not being ready for the new rules. The most optimistic Brexiteers announced that “the Brexit ‘chaos’ is already over“

 This statement must feel like a slap in the face for businesses and people whose livelihoods are still threatened by the impact of Brexit, including seed potato producers, producers of shellfish, and people in Northern Ireland. Hannah Essex co-executive director at the British Chamber of Commerce (BCC) is quoted as saying “difficulties exporters are facing are not just 'teething problems’.”

 Meanwhile, Brexiters confidently use the ONS figures to trumpet the UK is now back to a ‘normal’ level of trade with the EU proving all Remainers and the so-called ‘project fear’ wrong. The Spectator’s Matthew Lynn commented that “the UK’s exports to the EU rose to £11.6bn in February, up from £7.9 billion in January. Overall, they were only slightly below last year’s £12 billion monthly average.”

 This argument is flawed in several respects. One issue is that by January 2021 trade in goods in advanced economies was largely back to pre-pandemic levels. So, the relevant comparison should not be the monthly average for 2020, which was of course much lower than in a normal year due to Covid. A better comparison is therefore February 2020, which was the last month not impacted by Covid19. As EY’s Sally James pointed out on BBC 4’s Today Programme (14 of April 2021 @24:37), compared to February 2020, exports in goods to the EU were down nearly £2bn (£1.64bn to be precise), or 12%. On the monthly average for 2019, which was £14.3bn, they were down 18%.

 More generally, while Covid of course still impacts the UK economy, it is possible to estimate the effect of Brexit net of Covid. Thus, the Centre for European Reform (CER) has devised a sophisticated method to estimate the impact of Brexit on UK trade net of Covid. Based on this method, the CER estimates that UK’s goods trade in February was 5% lower than it would be had the UK remained in the EU.

 Of course, even a 5% decline (rather than the trumpeted 46.6% increase) is definitely an improvement on the January figures, which were the worst on record. Yet, we should not forget that monthly trade figures are sensitive to one off events and special factors. Thus, the February figures may look better than expected, partly because the ‘volatile trade in precious metals’ rose sharply. If precious metals go down this month or in the future, the picture may change again.

 Regardless of the economic and statistical realities, the ONS figures seem to have unleashed pent-up optimism amongst Brexiters, which spilt over into the papers and media outlets. Another piece in the Spectator went on to bust ‘five Remainer predictions’ that supposedly have turned out to be wrong. Let’s look at the arguments behind this claim.

 Myth busting busting

 The first one of these ‘wrong doomsayer predictions’ was Osborne’s declaration that by 2030 each household would be £4,300 worse of. To be sure, then Chancellor Osborne used and interpreted this figure in a way that was indeed questionable and perhaps even dishonest. But the figure came out of a serious analysis from April 2016 called The long-term economic impact of EU membership and the alternatives, which econometrically modelled the potential impact of Brexit. The report found that under a bilateral agreement with the EU, UK GDP would decline by an amount equivalent to £4,3000 per household (note: this was not worst-case scenario the report predicted: for a no deal Brexit the report predicted a £5,200 decline). While predictions are of course almost always wrong to some extent – i.e. they do not correspond 100% with reality – and there are assumptions and methodological choices in such analyses that can be questioned, the basic figure was based on sound analysis (albeit admittedly not interpreted in the proper way by Osborne).

 Yet, what is more interesting still is how the Spectator uses this figure in 2021 to prove that Remainers were wrong. The author refers to ONS statistics to declare that ‘in the five years since that real disposable income per head has risen from £5,177 in the second quarter of 2016 to £5,354 at the end of 2020.’

 This is another frivolous use of statistics by Brexiteers, which seems as disingenuous as Osborne’s use of the £4,300 figure during the Brexit referendum campaign. In fact, it shows an astonishing confusion between the Brexit referendum vote and the actual action of Brexit, i.e. the coming into force of new trading rules between the EU and the UK, which or course only happened in January  2021. In the five-year period up to January 1st, 2021, the anticipation of Brexit of course affected businesses’ and households’ choices and hence the economy. But the government’s modelling was based on ‘actual Brexit,’ i.e. the impact of different scenarios for possible new trading arrangements with the EU – including EEA membership, a loser FTA, and a no-deal scenario. The Spectator also ignores the fact that the figure that Osborne (mis)used was a much longer-term prediction (2016-2030) than the five-year window the spectator compares it to, which makes the comparison entirely baseless.

 But let’s stick with the figures about disposable household income for a minute and assume that a rise in disposable household income between the point Brexit actually happened (i.e. end of transition period on 1st of January 2021) and a future point in time would prove Remainers wrong. Even that is a false argument, as the Spectator’s own Nelson Fraser pointed out in response to Osborne’s figures back in 2016: whether or not disposable income rises/declines is not the issue. The question is whether it would have risen more inside than outside the EU. Remainers will probably argue it would have risen more inside the EU, Brexiteers will insist it would have risen less or declined. As Fraser calculated at the time, the government’s April 2016 report would have predicted a rise in disposable household income of £5,400 by 2030 outside the EU and of £6,880 inside the EU, which would amount to a ‘Brexit cost’ of £1,480 (instead of £4,300). Whether that would be a cost worth incurring for regained ‘sovereignty’ and could be off-set by a ‘modest tax cut’ is another question, but the point here is that any assessment of whether or not Remainers were right has to be made against assumptions about the counterfactual: what would have been had the UK not left the UK? Estimating such counterfactuals are difficult exercise, especially when applied post hoc to complex political processes.  But the impact of Brexit can only ever be meaningfully compared to such hypothetical scenarios. Thankfully some sophisticated methods exist – like the CER approach for instance. Yet, the Spectator confidently ignores this basic truth and makes huge claims based on flawed logic.

 It is not worth going into the busting of the four other ‘doomsday predictions’ mentioned in that piece. They are essentially all based on the same flawed logic of comparing Remainers predictions to figures taken over a period when Brexit had not actually happened yet and when it was anyone’s guess whether we would end up closer to an EEA-style arrangement or be trading under WTO rules after Brexit. That’s the case of the discussion of GDP growth predictions, job losses (both compared between 2016 and 2020) and the budget implications.

 The fifth and final prediction that turned out to be wrong according to that piece was the ‘collapse of the West’, which the columnist attributes to both Donald Tusk and David Cameroon. The fact that Western civilisation still exists four months after Brexit is taken as evidence that Remainers were wrong. Similarly, the columnist takes the fact that Scottland still is a member of the UK four months after the end of the transition period as prove that Remainers’ warnings about the future of the Union were wrong. I think it would be an insult to readers’ intelligence to seriously engage with such naïve arguments, given the upcoming Holyrood elections and whatever they may mean for Indyref 2. But it should be obvious to any reader that the long term impact of Brexit on geopolitical power balances will be subtle, complex, and intricate and will take time to be visible (which Donald Tusk of course acknowledge by saying he was talking with a historian’s hat on).

 Readers may think it’s not worth getting all worked up about two silly opinion pieces. However, this type of disingenuous right-wing populist discourse is also evident in more serious fora. This can have very real implications on public opinion and hence politics.

 Another news item this week seems to indicate that Brexiteers’ disingenuous discursive strategies are working, and journalists and economic actors start buying into it.

 Financial Services: The focus on the size of the self-inflicted wound

 The New Financial Think Tank has published a report on the impact of Brexit on the UK financial sector with three key findings: Firstly, at least 440 firms have relocated from the City of London to destinations inside the EU; secondly, £900bn in assets have been moved out of London; thirdly, 7,500 jobs have been lost in London.

 The extraordinary thing about the report, however, is how various media outlets reported about it. Some outlets did consider the findings to be worse than expected, but for many it was turned into a good news story. This happened in the following way: In an interview with William Wright, CEO of the New Financial think tank, a journalist at BBC’s Today programme (16.4.2021 at 6:20am) pointed out that 7,500 lost jobs was actually not as bad as predicted before the referendum (referring to an oft-quoted PWC report which predicted up to 100,000 job losses). Wright had to acknowledge that, but pointed out that – only 100 days after Brexit – over 440 firms had left the city and £900bn worth of assets moved out of London. But even that ended up being presented as good news: The firms that have moved activities out of London now have access to the EU’s single market and they do not depend on any (still to be concluded) trade agreements on services. This is how the loss of 7,500 jobs and the move of 10% of the assets of the banking system out of the UK, becomes a good news story in Brexitland.

 A consequence of this sort of reporting is that Remainers end up having to defend their predictions rather than Brexiteers having to defend the reality of 7,500 jobs losses.  Which can be done of course: There are various problems with using the 7,500 lost jobs as an argument that Remainers were wrong about the impact of Brexit: For one, the PWC report predicted that figure to be reached by 2020, but was investigating the impact of actually exiting the EU rather than the impact of being stuck in a five-year limbo where none knew which way Brexit would go. It is therefore important to remember that we are only four and a half months into ‘real existing Brexit’ and 7,5000 jobs have been lost (albeit starting in 2016 of course). For the other, the relationship with the EU around financial services is still up in the air and some firms may still wait and see what agreement might be reached before they decide what to do.

 It is important to deconstruct the false arguments made by Brexiteers. Yet, the really shocking thing is that in Brexitland a loss of 7,500 jobs and the move of £900bn in bank assets out of the country is considered good news, because it is not as bad as some – arguably not without political motives – said  it might be. We are hence debating the size of the self-inflicted wound rather than who wounded us in the first place. indeed, it is not clear why the benchmark for judging whether Brexit is a success or a disaster should be the Remainers’ predictions about how bad it could get, rather than the many promises Brexiteers have been quietly dropped,  abandoned,  or turned out to be wrong at various stages of the process. Had Brexit really been an incontestably ‘good thing’ as promised, of course Brexiteers would not have to use this type of discursive strategies. Yet, in Brexitland the onus has been reversed so that now Remainers were wrong because things are not as bad as they thought they would be. Worse still, that assessment is made a mere 100 days after Brexit, based on one single data point (‘See, exports bounced back in February!’), on exceedingly low expectations (‘See, only 7500 jobs were lost in the City!’), or completely neglect any realistic timeline within which some of Brexits’ worst consequences might materialise (‘See, Scotland is still part of the UK!’). The reversal of the onus allows Brexiteers to celebrate a monthly loss of around £1.7bn of exports, a 5% decline in trade, or the loss of 7,5000 jobs like a victory.

 The blame game

 A further weapon in the Brexiteers’ arsenal is blame apportioning, whereby any Brexit-related figures that cannot be turned into a good news story, are blamed on the EU. A striking example of this mechanism at work came this morning on Radio 4’s Farming Today (17.4.2021) programme. The (pro-Brexit) Institute for Economic Affairs’ Shanker Singham was interviewed and asked what he thought about the anger expressed by shellfish- and seed potato producers who – despite Brexiteers’ optimistic proclamation that ‘the Brexit chaos is over’ – have essentially lost EU market access and continue suffering from Brexit (one shellfish producer from Northumbria called the past 100 days of real existing Brexit ‘easily […] the most difficult quarter in any period in my working life.’)

 Singham’s response is a perfect example of the above-mentioned ‘blame game.’ ‘I share their anger,’ he said, but insisted that the anger was misdirected: Rather than the Brexiteers’ broken promise of frictionless trade, the farmers and producers of shellfish should be angry at the EU. The suggestion was that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) obliges the EU to consider accepting UK regulations as equivalent to EU standards and hence granting market access. For Singham, by banning class B molluscs and UK seed potatoes from the EU market, the EU is falling short of that commitment and hence in breach of the TCA. This seems like a far-fetched claim. While the TCA leaves the option open for unilateral granting regulatory equivalence status and market access, it does by no means follow that withholding equivalence status implies a breach of the TCA. All the EU does in these specific cases is applying its existing regulations to the UK the same way it applies them to any other third country. That we are treated like a third country, of course, is not the EU’s fault, but rather the result of Johnson’s preference for a hard Brexit. So, Brexiteers ask farmers and producers to direct their anger at the EU for exercising their ‘sovereignty’ in the name of which we UK decided to leave the EU.

 Global Britain: Le doux commerce is turning bitter

 In this context, Boris Johnson is preparing his visit to India in order to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with New Delhi, which would be the first FTA agreement that India signs since the 1990s. While the government is hoping to double trade with India to £50bn a year – notably by lowering tariffs on cars and whiskey –, it is expected that India will in return ask for easier access for Indian nationals – including students – to UK visas. This of course, will put in peril another Brexiteer promise: To bring immigration figures down from pre-Brexit levels to the ‘tens of thousands.’ Given India’s track record of failed free trade negotiations over the past decade (with the EU, Australia and New Zealand among others), makes it unlikely that the Government’s envisage ‘early wins’ of cutting tariffs on whiskey and cars will materialise unless substantive concessions on migration are made.

 Ahead of the talks, UK companies like Vodafone to Cairn Energy, who have been embroiled in legal disputes with the Indian government for a number of years, insist that the UK government should support their interests. However, the need to conclude FTAs makes it unlikely that the government can afford such a position. Thus, in a reversal of the May government’s position, the government has withdrawn its support for Cairn Energy in tis long-running dispute with the Indian government. These may be early signs that the Global Britain strategy may push the government to become more accepting of breaches of international rules by its most coveted trading partners – turning Montesquieu’s ‘doux commerce’ into a bitter pill for many.

 In sum then, this week has provided ample evidence that – contrary to Brexiteers’ claims - Brexit is far from over (or as Chris Grey put it ‘we are still Brexiting’). Yet, Brexiteers are keen on closing down any debate and on declaring victory by staunchly defying reality. In the process, they use populist rhetorical devices, which may very well damage the British democracy further by undermining any basic norms of reasonable and honest argumentation. This in turn makes it more difficult for scientific evidence-based argumentation to have any impact on public opinion. Instead, in the Brexiteer universe, events and figures are twisted and distorted and the onus for the failure of Brexit is placed on the Remainers. These sort of bad faith arguments do not bother Brexiteers of course. But while these strategies may lead to electoral success, they do not bode well for the political culture in this country after Brexit.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 11 April 2021 - The (Predictable) Return of Violence in Northern Ireland and the (Possible) Shape of Things to Come

This week, the now usual stories about the impact of the new UK-EU trading arrangements on consumers and the various issues faced by Britons with second homes in EU countries were overshadowed by the predictable, but nevertheless deeply saddening, news of a return of violence to the streets of Belfast and other towns and cities in Northern Ireland (NI).

Any reasonable commentator prefaced their analysis of the situation in Northern Ireland by saying that what is currently happening in NI is due to a complex set of circumstances – both long-term and short-term – and attributing it solely to Brexit would be an oversimplification.

But equally, there can be no doubt that the Johnson Government’s Brexit deal and in particular the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) have played a crucial role in the resurgence of violence. Unionist objection to the NIP has been one of the key Brexit-related stories since the end of the transition period on January 1st, 2021. Various commentators – including myself – have noted that the writing was – literally – on the wall for the situation to spiral out of control.

Ultimately, the outbreak of violence came less than a month after the Loyalist Communities Council (LCC) announced in a letter to the PM its withdrawal of support for the Good Friday Agreement until “our rights under the Agreement are restored and the protocol amended to ensure unfettered access for goods, services and citizens throughout the United Kingdom.” While the letter underscored that “that unionist opposition to the protocol should be peaceful and democratic,” David Campbell – chairman of the LCC – had earlier stated that unionists would "fight physically" against the NIP. The DUP too had threatened earlier to fight the NIP with “any means” at their disposal. Physical violence was hence on the cards. In this heated atmosphere, it comes as no surprise that other factors – such as the decision not to prosecute Sinn Féin politicians who allegedly broke Covid19 restrictions when attending the funeral of former IRA leader Bobby Storey – would lead to the flaring up of violence.

While there had been warnings about the impact of Brexit on the NI peace process, the pace at which slowly healing wounds were ripped open is still shocking. Arguably, this is the direct result of the UK government’s ‘identity politics’ strategy that turns Brexit into a cultural battle of ‘us against them,’ rather than addressing people’s very real political and economic concerns. This turns economic and political issues into questions of culture and belonging to a given group, which makes them very difficult to solve within the framework of pluralistic liberal democracy. Thus, Stephen Farry – MP for the northern Irish centrist, cross-community Alliance Party – stated that “[t]he problem is that unionism has decided to frame the protocol as an identity issue, and it’s very hard to see how you get round that and put the genie back in the bottle.”

It is no coincidence of course that Northern Ireland – with its painful history – is the place in the UK where the government’s identity politics have caused damage very quickly. However, old divisions may break up in other places very soon too and – if the current arrangement remains in place and the identity politics strategy continues – Brexit may become a serious centripetal force in other parts of the UK. Thus, while a second independence referendum in Scotland may very well go the same way as the first one – i.e. a majority of people voting to remain within the UK – Brexit means that Scots may have one less reason to vote in favour of remaining in the UK.

Yet, beyond the hugely important NI case (although it rarely makes the front page of British newspapers), the rapidly deteriorating situation in NI after the end of the Brexit transition period is a reflection of more fundamental issues with the current UK-EU post-Brexit arrangements. Indeed, it is hard to not see it as the logical consequence of the Johnson Government’s ‘hard Brexit’ strategy, which implied taking the UK out of the single market. This choice made a either a land border between the Republic of Ireland and NI or a sea border between Ireland and Great Britain inevitable. Since the EU – and the US – strongly objected to a land border on the island of Ireland – to safeguard the achievements of the Good Friday Agreement – and ‘hard Brexit’ taking off the table the option of the UK staying in the single market, the only other option was to have a border down the Irish Sea - even though conservative politicians still deny it exists.

There have been calls for the EU to be ‘flexible’ on the issue of Irish border controls, which can only mean the EU accepting the import of goods into the EU, which may not fully comply with EU rules and standards. However, asking for this sort of flexibility essentially means denying the EU the right to set and enforce its own rules for its internal market, which is of course the very same right that Brexiters invoke as main reason for wanting to leave the EU. It seems unlikely that what is unacceptable to the UK government will ever be acceptable to the EU. Therefore, in the long run, any future arrangement between the UK and the EU will have to acknowledge that the EU will insist either on checks at its external borders, or far-reaching alignment on rules and standards beyond them. The UK’s ability to ‘take back control’ will have to take place within the boundaries of that reality. The anger over the NIP clearly shows that Boris Johnson’s Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) and the associated NIP do not get that trade-off right and do not constitute a solid foundation that would do justice to the complex and fragile balance that holds the UK’s nations together.

Therefore, there can be no doubt that the TCA/NIP will have to evolve into something else if the UK is to survive Brexit. Arguably, economically speaking, a closer association with the EU than the current one would be desirable so as to increase access to the single market and reduce trade barriers. Indeed, Statista recently published a figure that illustrates just how ‘hard’ Johnson’s Brexit was.

 Yet, what are the realistic possibilities for alternatives to the current arrangements? Membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) offers one model, which does come with a need to automatically adopt EU legislation and therefore is incompatible with the ‘taking back control’ promise. Another, more complex, but arguably also more ‘sovereignty-friendly’ arrangement, is the arrangement of bilateral agreements, which Switzerland has pursued since the Swiss people rejected EEA membership in 1992.

The Norway solution: EEA maximal market access at a high price

The EEA, which entered into force on 1 January 1994, unites three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states – Norway, Lichtenstein, and Iceland – and the EU member states under an agreement that guarantees participation in the ‘four freedoms’ of the single market, namely free movement of capital, goods, people, and services. To make these four freedoms possible and guarantee “equal rights and obligations within the Internal Market,” the EEA agreement implies that non-EU member states that are part of the EEA very largely have to comply with EU legislation. While some important areas – such as agriculture and fisheries – are excluded from the agreement, in the areas that are covered, EEA membership for non-EU members essentially means gaining full access to the single market but at the price of having to follow EU law without having a say in its adoption. Indeed, the EEA is explicitly set up as a ‘dynamic’ treaty, which implies ‘the common rules of the EEA Agreement are updated continuously with new EU legislation.’ Moreover, the treaty rules are ‘interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the [European Court of Justice] given prior to the date of signature.’ In other words, the European Court of Justice has indirect jurisdiction over non-member states in relevant areas.

This trade-off between complete market access against very close alignment with EU legislation has recently given rise to political tensions in Norway – the largest non-EU EEA member state. Norway decided in 1994 to reject EU membership for fear of losing its sovereignty. Yet, joining the EEA instead arguably has compromised Norway’s sovereignty to a much larger extent than membership would have.

In the current general election campaign, the Norwegian Centre Party is campaigning against EEA membership, objecting to the ever evolving EU legislation which Oslo has to adapt without any say in its formulation. In a debate that will ring familiar to anyone who follows the Brexit debates, conservative PM Erna Solberg warns of any attempts to leave the EEA pointing at the importance of access to the single market for a country that exports 70% of its non-oil exports to the EU. Centre Party leader Trygve Slagsvold Vedum – who is polling strongly ahead of the elections – rejects her arguments as “fearmongering” and promises that Norway is “still going to have an agreement with the EU, a better agreement.”

The Norwegian case illustrates the fundamental flaw in the idea that being outside the EU will automatically mean freedom to adopt one’s own rules (what Brexiters call ‘sovereignty’). Norway currently has not found any solution to the market access-sovereignty trade off that also lies at the heart of Brexit.

The Swiss Solution: The end of ‘cherry picking’?

Another arrangement that may hold some lessons for the UK is the Swiss solution. Like Norway, Switzerland never decided to join the EU, but – contrary to its fellow EFTA members – it also rejected membership of the EEA in a hotly disputed referendum in 1992. Since then, Switzerland has established a complex network of bilateral agreements with the EU, based on 120 sectoral treaties and agreements.

Arguably, Switzerland is the country that has pushed the sovereignty-market access balance as far as any third country. Switzerland largely participates in the single market – including the free movement of people, although with some accompanying measure [DE] in place to avoid the undercutting of working standards and wages by foreign workers  – , without accepting an automatic adoption of EU law as is the case of the EEA. Instead, Switzerland practices a legal doctrine called ‘autonomous adaptation’ (autonomer Nachvollzug) whereby EU law is selectively and flexibly incorporated into domestic Swiss law to guarantee a considerable alignment with EU rules.  This approach provides Swiss policy makers with considerable leeway, while still guaranteeing market access through extensive alignment on EU rules. Yet, this also makes constant renegotiation of the bilateral agreements with the EU necessary.

This system has increasingly come under pressure from the EU side, which has insisted on a ‘framework agreement’ and the establishment of a dispute resolution process involving ECJ jurisdiction. This has led over the past years to increasingly tense negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. While a draft framework agreement was agreed on in 2018, the agreement is considered to have little chance of finding domestic support in Switzerland, where it will be subject to a popular referendum.

The sticking points will sound familiar to observers of Brexit: Besides the ‘accompanying measures’ and the question of EU citizens’ rights, the key issues are the question of state subsidies and the role of the European Court of Justice [DE] in adjudicating disputes.

Just like in Britain, the latter point is a particularly thorny question in Switzerland where the rejection of ‘foreign judges’ is baked into the founding myth of the country. Indeed, the so-called Federal Charter, one of the founding constitutional documents of the Swiss Confederation from the 13th or 14th century (depending on who you ask), explicitly rejects judges that are not ‘compatriots.’ The rejection of foreign judges is a highly politicised issue. Thus, the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party launched a popular initiative with the title ‘Swiss Law instead of Foreign Judges,’ which aimed at placing the Swiss constitute above international law, including the European Human Rights Convention. While the initiative was rejected by two-thirds of the voters, the Swiss government is aware of the sensitivity of the issue which makes an agreement with the EU on a framework agreement difficult.

The most recent solution to the ECJ jurisdiction issue – which may bear some lessons for the UK – consists of the establishment of a court of arbitration with three judges, one each elected by the EU and Switzerland and a third one elected by the these two judges. For conflicts concerning EU law, however, the arbitration court would be required to seek advice from the ECJ and would be bound by that advice. Therefore, under the draft agreement, the ECJ does have jurisdiction over Swiss persons in some circumstances. This is indeed the EU’s own red line. Given the Swiss rejection of ‘foreign judges,’ it will be interesting to see if the proposed arrangement that limits ECJ jurisdiction to cases concerning EU law only and the addition an additional judicial layer (the court of arbitration), which makes ECJ jurisdiction less direct and hence less visible, will constitute a politically acceptable solution for the Swiss Parliament and ultimately voters. The arrangement could become interesting for any future arrangement that the UK may negotiated with the EU. In fact, TCA already contains a dispute resolution mechanism that is not dissimilar to the Swiss solution, although the ECJ’s role is less explicitly acknowledged.

Switzerland has fared very well with its nearly 30 years of ‘cherry picking,’ but clearly the EU is increasingly reluctant to offer any third country such an advantageous arrangement without subjecting itself completely to EU legislation and ECJ jurisdiction, which British policy makers may need to keep in mind.

 The End of the EU’s Territorial Expansion?

The above examples show that the UK is by far not the only country struggling to find an arrangement with the EU that strikes the right balance between ‘sovereignty’ – rightly or wrongly defined as the ability to deviate from EU rules – and market access. Indeed, Andrew Duff – former Lib Dem MEP – recently argued that Brexit constitutes a turning point not just for the UK but also for the EU. After a long phase of continuous territorial expansion, it is likely that the EU will not grow much further. Brexit may mark new phase where the focus is not on expansion but on finding a new model form managing the long-term relationships with an increasing number of important trading partners that are not members states. Indeed, such a model could stabilise relationships not just with the UK, Switzerland, and Norway, but also other countries, which for different reasons do not want to or will not be allowed to become full members, such as Turkey and Ukraine. Duff argues for  an ‘associated country’ status that would avoid the highly politicised and ineffective models of constant renegotiation and conflicts that mars the relationship with its closest non-members at the moment. It is to be hoped that the EU will indeed refocus its priorities in this respect.

From the UK perspective, on the other hand, a key stumbling block on the path towards such a stable future arrangement with the EU is the Conservative Party’s denial of the reality that the TCA and NIP are not a solid foundation for the future relationship with the UK. A striking illustration of this denial came this week in the form of a Conservative Party social media invitation to participate in a ‘Global Britain Survey.’ The Facebook post contained the statement “We secured a trade deal with the EU which fully delivered on our promises to take back control of our laws, borders, money and trade.” Question 5 of the questionnaire asked “Now that we have reclaimed our independence, we’re committed to only do deals which benefit the whole UK. Do you support this red line?”

Running this survey during the week when the failure of the TCA and the NIP must have become blatantly obvious to all but the staunchest supporters of the hard Brexit line, illustrates a lack of realism in the governing party that will prevent any reasonable arrangement with the EU impossible. As long as this denial of reality remains the dominant political ideology, the focus will remain on identity politics and on blaming the other side for any negative consequences of Brexit. The sad events in NI this week should be a stark warning about where this may lead us.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 3 April 2021: ‘Leavers and Remainers’ or ‘Winners and Losers’? How the cultural and economic Brexit divides impact British politics

There is not that much big Brexit-related news to report this past week. Actually, there has been quite a bit of good news (relatively speaking) on the Brexit front. Since my last post, there has been some progress on data protection, and on the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP). Moreover, the UK and the EU have found an agreement on the long-awaited Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on financial services (although observers were quick to point out that all the MoU does is establish another ‘toothless talking shop’ that was as useful as a ‘chocolate teapot’).

But there were also the by now habitual stories of concerns over the impact of trade barriers on UK companies (especially smaller ones), of relocation of businesses from the UK to the EU, of the impact of Brexit on British citizens’ everyday life (especially those living in the EU who face various issues from driving licences to their right to remain in the EU), and of its impact on EU citizens living in the UK (including children). While these may all seem like relatively minor inconveniences, they are important to keep track of, because seemingly innocuous stories oftentimes hide a great deal of personal suffering for the people concerned.

At another level, these stories are important because they may provide us with clues about where the country is headed politically speaking. Brexit so far has largely been about opinions and expectations, not reality. Now that we have entered the realm of reality, the divide between ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ may slowly be replaced by a divide between actual ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of Brexit. While ‘Leavers’ coincides with ‘winners’ in terms of the referendum outcome, in terms of the Brexit reality – due to their predominant socio-economic characteristics – this may not turn out to be true. Similarly, while Remainers are often considered (sore) losers of the referendum, the economic realities underlying the Brexit vote imply that Remainers are less likely than Leavers to bear the brunt of the ‘real existing Brexit.’ This implies important shifts in the political cleavages in British politics, which both major parties may be struggling to react to. Time to take a closer look at the emerging post-Brexit politics.

From Remainers and Leavers to Winners and Losers – New cleavages in British politics

Populist phenomena – which in my view Brexit is an example of – can be explained in two ways: culturally and economically.

The Leave and Remain labels, as they are currently used, refer to an important extent to cultural differences in values and norms. Indeed, the leave – remain divide reflects a new political cleavage that has opened in many countries around the world and goes beyond the traditional left-right divide. It is described by some political scientists as a cultural chasm between an urban, cosmopolitan elite who celebrate values of liberalism, multiculturalism, and pluralism and the rural and industrial ‘left-behinds’ who defend more traditional – even nationalist and nativist – values. Leave voters fit the latter description quite well. Indeed, analyses of the referendum result show that the two main factors explaining the Brexit vote is age and education: the older and the lower your educational achievement, the more likely you are to have voted leave. These characteristics also tend to correlate with defending more nationalist, traditionalist values, as opposed to liberal cosmopolitan ones. Here, opposition to immigration – not just for its economic effects – but also for its impact on national culture is a key factor to vote for Brexit.

However, Brexit was not just about culture and values, but also about very real economic issues that people are facing. Economic factors are the second most important factors explaining the leave vote. Unemployment, stagnating real wages, and austerity are important – some hotly debated – socio-economic causes for voting for Brexit. Thus, an influential study found that individuals and areas affected by the austerity measures introduced by the Coalition government after 2010, were more likely to support UKIP and to vote leave than individuals and areas not affected by austerity. More generally, people with low skill levels in low-paid jobs or out of work, were more likely to vote for Brexit than people with in well-paid high-skilled jobs.

The reason for this relation between socio-economic status and preferences for and against Brexit, is that the integration of markets has undoubtably put pressure on the former groups’ living standards, while the latter in generally rather benefited from increased mobility and more economic freedom. Indeed, there is a lot of academic evidence that liberalisation of trade, capital, and migration flows puts pressure on low-skilled workers’ living standards (e.g. for the UK and for the US). In Europe, the EU has been the main driver of market integration in all three areas (capital, labour, trade) – indeed it has been described as a ‘liberalisation machine.’ A particular important issue here is that the EU’s ‘freedom of establishment’ right and the related right to provide services across borders. This has allowed companies to pay EU migrants working in the UK wages based on the conditions of employment prevailing in their home country, which explains some of the economic grievances of leave voters. It cannot be denied that the EU does bear some responsibility for these grievances by exacerbating deindustrialisation and pressures on wages.

Yet, liberalisation has not got to be a disaster, as it can be selective, managed, and accompanied by necessary social measures to soften the impact of liberalisation on low skilled workers. In the EU such accompanying social measure often have not kept pace with liberalisation. However, we should not forget that part of the reason for the lagging of social policies behind liberalisation, is precisely because successive UK governments have pushed back against the EU’s social agenda, e.g. opting out of the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘social chapter’ when it was introduced in 1992. Similarly, the domestic social policies of successive UK governments did nothing to protect domestic workers from the impact of liberalisation, but rather tried to undercut EU labour and social standards. Therefore, it was UK governments which translated the international pressures into policies that ultimately transformed the UK economy into a low skill, low productivity economy. Other countries inside the EU – facing the very same pressure – chose to invest in skills instead, leading to higher productive that kept their workers internationally competitive, and wages and living standards up. More generally, like I have argued in some of my academic work, Anglo-Saxon countries tend to ‘manufacture discontent’ by not protecting their low-skilled workers from increased competition in global markets.

Given the interplay between international- and national policies, it seems unlikely that Brexit per se will improve the economic condition of low skilled workers. It is unlikely that – especially conservative – UK governments will fundamentally change their social policies to protect workers from downward pressures on wages.  Similarly, like I wrote last week, on the capital front ‘global Britain’ will not mean lower levels of capital mobility – including the buying up of British firms by foreign investors and subsequent restructurings. Indeed, making up for losing access to the EU Single Market may very well increase globalisation pressures especially if the UK decides to follow the ‘Singapore on Thames’ post-Brexit model. This all suggests that the more culturally dominated remain v. leave divide will revert back to an (economic) winner v. loser divide that reflects underlying economic causes of political discontent.

The cultural values underlying the remain v. leave divide overlap to a considerable extent with the economic ‘winner’ v. ‘loser’ of globalisation divide, as the culturally liberal, cosmopolitan urban elite also tends to have higher levels of educational and better paid jobs than culturally more conservative and lower skilled workers outside post-industrial urban growth areas. Yet, the two dimensions are analytically distinct, and this has very important political implications. Indeed, dealing with these two aspects of popular discontent – cultural and economic – arguably requires different political strategies – and the two major UK parties may not have found the right strategies for the post-Brexit politics yet.

Dealing with cultural and economic cleavages: The emerging political strategies

So far, the Tory party’s strategy under Johnson’s leadership has primarily focused on the cultural divide. Brexit certainly has provided leave voters with some satisfaction in this respect. The ‘two-finger salute from the working class’ to the ‘metropolitan middle class’ always has been one of the goals of the protest vote which Brexit arguably was. Indeed, UKIP and Brexit supporters often report general dissatisfaction with political elites, rather than leaving the EU, as main motivation for their vote. Similarly, seeing tens of thousands foreign-born workers leave the UK, is precisely what many leave voters wanted and will be pleased to see happening. As I wrote before, so far, the Johnson government has managed to ride this wave by keeping resentments against liberal urban elites and the EU alive. From this perspective, the abrasive political style the Johnson government and his ‘Brexit minster’ Lord Frost have adopted makes perfect political sense. Nationalist grand standing about various Brexit related issues – and indeed not so Brexit-related ones – allows the government to continue blaming the EU for anything that is not going well in this country, catering thus to the frustrations about ‘wanting our country’ back and such like. However, this nationalist strategy will run its course for two reasons.

Firstly, the government will have to resign itself to the fact that it needs to start building a more constructive relationship with the EU to tackle the serious issues that need addressing. There are signs that this has already started happening this week, with the UK government’s rhetoric becoming more conciliatory over key issues like the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), the financial service agreement, and the Covid19 vaccine row. On all three issues, the UK government has substituted negotiating behind closed doors for public grandstanding. While this will turn what Chris Grey calls the ERG Brexit ultras against the government, it is a necessary shift in the government’s approach to make post-Brexit relationships with the EU work.

Secondly, Brexit was a battle against windmills. The windmill was defeated. But soon people will realise that the windmill was not the problem. Or at least it was only partly to blame for their problems. When that happens, people will start asking the government to actually address the economic grievances that made them vote for Brexit and for Johnson in the 2019 General Election. What substantive policies can the government offer to address those issues?

Due to the pandemic, the chancellor Rishi Sunak, has so far shown a – for a conservative – rather uncharacteristic tendency towards anti-cyclical public spending. Public spending is one way of keeping the leave-voting part of the electorate happy after Brexit. Yet, senior conservatives are already voicing concerns about current levels of public spending, which suggests that once the pandemic is over, a conservative chancellor will come under pressure to return to a more traditional conservative policy of balancing the books. Of course, the Johnson government is not a usual conservative government, but has a distinct populist streak, which may mean it is less likely to adopt an austerity policy like PM Cameron and his chancellor George Osborne did. A return of austerity without the EU to blame for people’s grievances could mean a loss in political support in key electoral battlegrounds like the ‘red wall’ constituencies, but it is unlikely future conservative governments will be able to keep public spending at the level needed to compensate the ‘losers of globalisation.’

Beyond public spending, the Johnson government’s economic policies may contain some solutions for the economic grievances felt by leave voting constituencies. Thus, the government’s ‘levelling up’ agenda that aims at shifting some of the economic activity from London and the South East to other parts of the country, makes a great deal of sense. However, so far this agenda has been mainly focussed on environmentally disastrous big infrastructure projects like HS2 and moving government and civil service departments from London to other parts of the country. It is very doubtful that such government-focused moves alone will lead to the industrial transformation needed to create a genuinely more decentralised and equal UK economy. The latter goal seems particularly compromised by the recent decision by business secretary Kwasi Kwarteng to axe the government’s plan for an industrial policy that could have contributed to achieving that goal.

Therefore, once the effect of the nationalist anti-EU rhetoric wears off and people start asking for real change, the conservative party may be exposed economically speaking and lack realistic and working economic policies to address people’s actual grievances. The conservatives seem to be aware of that at one level, which would explain the government’s focus on nurturing the cultural divide. But this may just delay the necessary step of developing an effective economic policy response to the underlying economic divide.

What does labour’s strategy look like? Here, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Labour continues struggling to find its place in the Brexit reality. Indeed, as long as the focus remains on the cultural divide, labour will be struggling to gain the upper hand in elector contests against the Tory’s outside the large urban areas. This was very clearly illustrated this week by the row over the display of the Union Jack. Labour seemed at a loss to formulate any convincing response to the conservatives’ strategy of casting doubt on labour’s patriotic credentials. The FT cites a labour frontbencher as saying that the conservatives “want to maintain the Brexit divide which has worked for them.” In the absence of being able to portray itself as the more patriotic of the two major parties, Labour will be struggling to counter the conservatives at the level of the cultural divide and win back the support of ‘red wall’ voters and other traditionally labour-voting constituencies. So, labour has a strong interest in shifting the attention from politicising the cultural divide towards the economic one. If it manages to do so, then the conservatives relatively limited economic responses may give labour a chance to win back some of the support it has lost to Johnson’s conservatives in the 2019 General Election.

A first test of this hypothesis will come in about a month time with the Hartlepool by-election. Labour is defending a narrow lead of around 3000 votes with a candidate who was pro-remain, running in one of the strongest Leave-voting constituencies in the country. Ahead of that vote, labour leader Sir Keir Starmer has indeed sought to move beyond the leave-remain divide by explicitly stating that there was no case for re-joining the EU. With this stance Starmer has disappoint many Remainers (and Rejoiners) by reneging his previous support for a second referendum and earned him a lot of criticism. Yet, based on the above analyse, Starmer’s strategy makes good sense. The sooner the voters will care more about the economic issues underlying the Brexit vote than about the cultural values of national sovereignty, the sooner labour will be able to shift the public debate onto economic policy issues where it stands a much better chance of competing with the conservatives than at the cultural level.

Regardless of where one’s party loyalties lie, it is to be hoped that such a shift from the cultural to the economic divide will indeed take place. To start healing the deep divisions in British society that were revealed and reinforced by Brexit, real solutions for people’s real problems are needed, rather than patriotic and nationalist rhetoric to further stir up popular discontent.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 27 March 2021 : Asymmetries in views and in trade: What some European papers say about the ‘vaccine war’ and the emergence of ‘asymmetric trade patterns’

The dominant (supposedly) Brexit-related story this week was the row with the EU over vaccine exports between the UK and the EU. EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen announced last Saturday that the EU was considering more stringent rules for exports of Covid19 vaccines to allow it to ban exports of AstraZeneca doses.  

Predictably, Monday’s British papers extensively reported on the story and headlines about a 'vaccine war’ between the EU and the UK were prominent. Equally predictably, the Johnson government ministers seemed to relish the opportunity for a spat with the EU. One of them is on record telling the EU to act like ‘grown-ups’. Health Secretary Matt Hancock – referring to the UK’s exclusivity contract with AstraZeneca – triumphantly declared “Our contract trumps theirs. It’s called contract law — it’s very straightforward.”  He added: “I believe that free trading nations follow the law of contracts,” which can only be seen as sarcasm given the Johnson government’s track record of disregarding its legal commitments.

Yet, as Chris Grey and others have pointed out, the row over vaccines has very little to do with Brexit. In fact, the only reason why it is related to Brexit, is because the government wants it to be. Indeed, it is another way to keep the nationalist fire burning that brought the Johnson government to power.

Given the strong reactions to von der Leyen’s announcement in the UK, I thought a look across the Channel might be instructive. Browsing some national newspapers web pages on Monday morning, quickly revealed one thing: the vaccine row did not really make frontpage news in France or Germany.

It took me a few minutes of digging to find any reporting on the issue on the web page of the centre left Le Monde for instance. Interestingly, the article that I did eventually find provides a very different take on the story than what I found in most British news outlets. Rather than a story about the EU versus the British government (or even the British people), the focus in Le Monde was very much on the Commission’s attack on AstraZeneca as a company. Thus, the article [FR] stated that “The pharmaceutical group is in the hot seat in Europe because of delays in the delivery of doses.” The article mentions the company’s failure to live up to its contractual obligation to delivery 90m doses during the first quarter and 180m does in the second quarter (a shortfall 60m and 110m respectively according to the paper). Britain is mentioned only once and only when citing AstraZeneca’s defence that referred to export restrictions imposed by non-EU countries that prevented the company from sending vaccines to the EU, which - Le Monde points out – can only refer to the UK and the USA, as the only non-EU production locations mentioned in the EU’s contract.  The article also cites a high-ranking EU official saying that the EU was suspecting that the problem has arisen because the company has sold the same doses several times. This seems to be the real scandal according to Le Monde. Overall, then, the article very much focuses on the company – which incidentally is referred to as a Swedish-British Group (Swedish first, British second) and the AstraZeneca vaccine is not called the ‘Oxford jab’ – rather than on the UK.

It was even harder to find any reporting on the issue on the web page of Libération on Monday. However, the centre-left/left daily’s previous reporting [FR] on the EU Commission’s attitude towards vaccine exports is interesting however. When the Commission first floated the idea of export approval legislation, the left-leaning newspaper did choose very strong language … to condemn the Commission president’s actions: ”Vaccins : quelle mouche a piqué Ursula von der Leyen ?” [Vaccines: what’s gotten into Ursula von der Leyen?] and to go on “this weekend’s fuss over the export control of Covid-19 vaccines is a striking illustration of the incompetence, disorganization, and paranoia that are becoming the hallmarks of the von der Leyen administration.”

On Thursday 25th March, 2021, the 27 EU member states had moved to back von der Leyen’s policy, enabling the commission to ban exports if deemed necessary. The tone in the French newspapers had not changed much.

Le Monde commented on the member states’ decision to back von der Leyen’s policy, stating that the EU had decided on “a vaccine war with the UK.” But the tone of the reporting is not bellicose and does not suggest that the vaccine war is something desirable from the French perspective. Again, the focus is on AstraZeneca’s rather than Britain’s role in the row. Brussel correspondent Virginie Malingre in a web chat with readers [FR] did mention the British reluctance to let AstraZeneca export doses produced in the UK to the continent, but the focus is on blaming AstraZeneca for signing “contracts with Europe and the UK that are not compatible [FR].” The correspondent also regretted the EU’s naivety when signing the contract without an exclusivity clause that Britain’s contract contains (guaranteeing that the first 100m doses would be delivered to Britain). But the focus of the reporting is once again on comparing AstraZeneca’s behaviour compared to other vaccine producers, rather than dwelling on the UK’s role.

A similar picture emerges from reporting in the right-wing Figaro, which extensively cites von der Leyen’s accusations against the UK for not exporting any doses to the EU [FR] as well as the French foreign minister’s statements [FR] to the same effect. But the focus is once again on the role that AstraZeneca plays in the row and puts the issue in a broader context noting that [FR] “over the last two months, the EU has exported 43 million doses to 33 countries, including the United Kingdom (10.9 million doses), Canada (6.6 million), Japan (5.4 million) and Mexico (4.4 million). It has not received a single dose in return.” The right-wing newspaper also notes the opposing voices within the EU, namely Belgium and the Netherlands [FR] who worry about their reputation within global pharmaceutical value chains. The paper does refer to the tense relationship between the EU and Britain as a factor affecting the way the issue is dealt with; quoting a diplomat [FR] as saying “If the UK and the EU were on good terms, we would be working together to see how AstraZeneca can serve both. But we're in this argument although we have the same interests and needs.”

Overall, no comparable bellicose, ‘us-versus-them’ rhetoric in some major French newspapers then.

What about on the other side of the Rhine? The German press seemed even less interested in the issue than the French one.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [GER], like the French ones, focussed on von der Leyen’s attacks on AstraZeneca rather than on Britain, noting that Biontech and Moderna did fulfil their contractual obligations, while AstraZeneca did not. The Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Germany’s second largest daily newspaper, seemed even less interested in the row, leading on Monday morning with possible sanctions against Turkey ahead of the EU summit instead. The coverage of the vaccine row, was pretty much limited to a factual report of what von der Leyen had said [GER]. Germany’s largest daily newspaper – the tabloid Bild – did not seem particularly interested in the issue either. An article from March 20th, 2021 after von der Leyen’s announcement, did mention the term ‘vaccine war,’ but only when summarising the British press’s reaction to the announcement: Brits talk about ‘vaccine war’ [GER]. The rest of the article focuses on other vaccine producers’ warning about the impossibility of implementing an export ban, due to possible retaliatory measures and disruption to global supply chains.

In short, clearly the European Commission’s president and some national governments – mainly France – adopt a tough stance on vaccine exports. Yet, an – admittedly cursory – glance at some German and French newspapers leaves no doubt that for our ‘European Friends’– to use the phrase that our PM (sarcastically or hypocritically one has to assume) has started to use –, the vaccine row is not about Brexit or even Britain. It is mainly about a Swedish-British private company that has contractual obligations towards the EU. This look beyond the borders confirms the view that it is mainly the British government (and perhaps part of the red top press) that wants this issue to be about Brexit, because it fuels their nationalist agenda.

Trade: Two parliamentary reports and emerging asymmetric trade relations

The other interesting development – this one genuinely Brexit-related – this week relates to trade. The UK Parliament has published two parallel reports on trade after Brexit. The reports do not contain anything new to anyone who has followed the events since January 1st, 2021, but seeing the vast number of issues that remain unsolved under Boris Johnson’s Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is quite frankly overwhelming.

The House of Lords’ EU Goods Sub-Committee published a report that unsurprisingly concluded that trade in goods was significantly harder after the end of the transition period. Indeed, the committee’s chair Baroness Verma explicitly states that “The Brexit trade deal struck with the EU may have prevented the nightmare of a ‘no deal’ exit for the UK, but a lot of unfinished business remains between the two sides.”

The report lists an impressive list of issues where the TCA does not provide any solutions. These include: The risk of unilateral tariffs due to discrepancies in subsidies regimes under ‘level playing field’ provisions; the impact of the ‘rules of origin’ provisions on supply chains (and notably the risk for producers from poorer countries to be squeezed out of them); the failure to conclude a mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessment is called a ‘significant blow,’ as it introduces new testing requirements; the risk of permanent physical checks at borders due to sanitary and phytosanitary measures on trade of food and animal products; the urgent need to invest in and simplify customs procedures; the impact of new VAT rules on traders; various problems related to the transport of goods, including the need to conclude bilateral aviation agreements with the 27 EU members states; and the need for more support for (small) businesses to navigate the ‘the substantial increase in administrative complexities’ (bonfire of red tape anyone?).

The House of Lords’ EU Services Sub-Committee’s parallel report on services trade is only slightly more positive. While it notes that the “TCA offers unprecedented cooperation on digital trade compared with other EU free trade agreements,” the list of concerns is worrying. Thus, the committee mentions the absence of mutual recognition of equivalence in financial services as a key issue and is concerned that “over time this may lead to a big shift of people and assets out of the UK.” Another big concern is the issue of business mobility provisions both for professional services and creative industries. The committee notes that “[t]here will be real problems for UK professionals whose qualifications are not recognised in the EU under current arrangements.” Mobility provisions will particularly affect professional services and the creative industries which employ 2m people but who will find it ‘difficult […] to tour in the EU.’

Meanwhile, the attempt to ‘take back control’ keeps producing interesting unintended consequences. Other Brexit bloggers have previously noted the paradoxical situation where the UK government’s unilateral decision to delay the introduction of certain border checks – due to delays in putting in place the necessary border infrastructure – means that exports have become more difficult, imports have not. In other words, EU companies continue to benefit from relatively easy access to the UK market, UK companies exporting to the continent face much stricter barriers. The resulting ‘asymmetric trade’ pattern advantages EU companies who face less competition at home, but maintain access to the UK market.

A similar pattern of ‘asymmetric trade’  - to the disadvantage of UK companies – has emerged in aviation. Alastair Wilson – Managing Director of Titan Airways – told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme [at 6:12am] about the impact of the TCA on chartered airlines. In the absence of multilateral or bilateral agreements about the ‘fifth freedom’ (air travel), UK-based airlines need to obtain permits from individual EU member states to fly to and within the EU. For France and Germany, the permit procedures follow a so-called “non-objections process” which applies to all third countries. This procedure implies that EU carriers have a first right of refusal to operate any given job. This in turn means UK companies have to show that all national carriers are unavailable before the UK airline can obtain a permit. Consequently, many jobs involving EU destinations go to EU carriers rather than UK ones. Yet, the reverse is not true. According to Alastair Wilson, the UK authorities adopt a more liberal approach, making it relatively easy for EU carriers to obtained permits to fly to and within the UK. These instances of ‘asymmetric trade’ are hardly compatible with the ‘taking back control’ rhetoric. While these problems can certainly be put down to ‘teething issues’ and may be resolved in time, Titan Airways has started the process of moving its headquarters from Stansted to Malta.

Taking back control…and selling out

Another piece of evidence about how shallow the notion of ‘taking back control’ is, comes from the latest news about an investment deal signed between the UK and Abu Dhabi, which will lead to considerable investment from the UAE country in UK life sciences and green technologies. This multibillion-pound deal is the first one signed by the new Office for Investment, which the PM launched in November to stimulate inward foreign investment.

Of course, there is nothing fundamentally new about the UK relying heavily on foreign investment and being willing to sell off the family silver more than any other European country (remember the Cadbury takeover?). Still, the Abu Dhabi deal is another stark reminder that anyone who may have voted for Brexit hoping for some sort of control not just over ‘our laws and borders,’ but also our economy, will be bitterly disappointed. Brexit will not increase British control over companies, but will replace dependence on investments from certain regions of the globe to others. This is neither surprising, nor necessarily a big problem depending on where one stands on free trade, human rights, and other issues, but it highlights the fundamentally ambiguous – dare I say ‘two-faced’? – nature of the Brexit project: promising at the same time national sovereignty and deepened international economic linkages. Other Brexit bloggers and particularly Chris Grey have noted this “longstanding and paradoxical dynamics of Brexit […] between Brexit as a nationalist and protectionist project and as a globalist free market project.” Achieving both will be impossible, but in the process of trying, important historically grown alliances and economic relationships may be destroyed and replaced with others.  

Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP): The gathering storm?

The week finished with some really worrying news from Northern Ireland. The Independent reported stark warnings from a senior unionist figure who considers that “[w]e are perilously close to a line which, when crossed, will lock us all into a pattern all too familiar.” In the Belfast News Letter, Peter Robinson, former DUP leader and First Minister of NI, warned that unionists “[…] reflect on the commitments they were given, and which have been appallingly broken leaving the odour of betrayal in the air.”

Earlier in the week, the EU had signalled its willingness to discuss (renegotiate?) the NIP with the UK government if the UK started to follow the agreed upon procedure of providing a road map before taking any unilateral decisions on grace periods and other trade issues. Given the unionists’ warning, it would seem imperative that the UK government seizes its chance to tackle the issues around the NIP as soon as possible by engaging with the EU in constructive talks rather than persisting with grandstanding and name-calling. As, Baroness Verma also noted, a more conciliatory attitude would help to solve some of the long list of trade issues the EU Goods Sub-Committee found: “Ongoing dialogue will be crucial to achieving smoother trade. The TCA should be treated as the start, not the end of the UK’s new relationship with the EU.”

Sadly, there is not much cause for optimism in this respect. Despite some conciliatory tones from the PM himself, his ministers spent another week fanning the flames rather than starting to build a more constructive relationship with the EU. This goes beyond rhetoric: The Lords’ EU Services Sub-Committee noted with regret that the government had decided to “defer establishing the Partnership Council and other governance arrangements under the TCA,” which are essential to guarantee a smoother implementation of the TCA. This does not bode well for the governments willingness to seize the opportunities to solve urgent issues such as the ones around the NIP before it is too late.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 20 March 2021: “Global Britain” and the Integrative Review: Boris Johnson’s second “have-your-cake-and-eat-it” moment

Global Britain. That is the slogan that encapsulates the Johnson government’s ambition and vision for Britain’s place in the world after Brexit. This week we got a first glimpse of how the government intends to implement that strategy. On Tuesday, the government published its long-awaited Integrative Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, entitled ‘Global Britain in a competitive age.’ The haphazard and in part contradictory strategy that emerges from the document does not inspire confidence in its potential to achieve the tricky balancing act the UK government is facing between the need to strike new trade deals while not further alienating its historical allies. With the EU launching legal action, over the UK government’s unilateral action on the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) and the USA increasingly weighing in on the issue, the latter goal seems increasingly urgent. Yet, the UK government’s new ‘sovereignty first’ doctrine may increasingly isolate the UK and lead its government to adopt an increasingly nationalist rhetoric to try and maintain domestic support.

The post-Brexit China strategy and its contradictions

The key points of the review that the media and commentators picked up on were the ambiguous attitude towards China and the unexpected announcement of an increase in the number of nuclear warheads.

Regarding the relationship with China the government walks the tight rope between acknowledging China as a threat and treating it as a valued trade and investment partner. All the ambiguity of the UK attitude is summarised in one sentence of the review (p.62): “China and the UK both benefit from bilateral trade and investment, but China also presents the biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.” The Review promises “deeper trade links and more Chinese investment in the UK,” but also that “[w]e will not hesitate to stand up for our values and our interests where they are threatened, or when China acts in breach of existing agreements.” How exactly this circle can be squared, the review does not say.

The Huffington Post published a quote by Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, which may shed some light on the government’s priorities. In the excerpt the Foreign Secretary made it clear that the UK would miss out on future trade opportunities and reduce its influence if it only dealt with countries with good human rights records. The UK is of course not the only country that has no hesitation to strike deals with countries whose human rights records are less than perfect (for instance, the EU agreed an investment deal with China late last year). But the bluntness of the foreign secretary’s statement does not suggest that standing up for values will be high on the British government’s priority list.

Yet, human rights issues may not be the only ones standing in the way of the ‘positive economic relationship’ with China that the review promises. Most importantly, the Review also contains a geo-political strategy called the “Indo-Pacific tilt” (p.64), that would see the UK’s foreign policy focus shift towards South East Asia. This strategy is considered at least partly aimed at thwarting Chinese ambitions in the region, creating an obvious incongruity with the aim to build a better economic relationships with China . Moreover, academic observers have pointed out the pressure that the Indo-Pacific tilt will put on the UK’s limited military resources, potentially leading to the UK overstretching its capacities and undermining its security commitments in Europe and the North Atlantic.

In sum, the China strategy set out in the review is in keeping with the Government’s ‘have-your-cake-and-eat-it’ rhetoric portrayed during the Brexit Deal negotiations, which will prove difficult to translate into practical policies.

The China strategy set out in the review immediately faced fierce criticism from within the Tory party. Tobias Ellwood, chair of the Commons defence select committee, argued that China should have been labelled a “geostrategic threat.” Yet, the prime minister insisted that those who wanted “a new cold war with China” were mistaken.” This soft stance on China clashes of course not only with the ‘hawkish’ parts of the Tory party, but also with the Biden administration’s current approach towards China, which creates additional sources of tension with the USA.

Nuclear deterrence policy: More broken promises

The Integrated review’s other much-cited point concerns the UK’s nuclear deterrence policy. With the review, the UK government abandons its commitment made in 2010 to reduce its nuclear warheads from 225 to 180, by the mid-2020s. Instead, the government suggests that the number of warheads should increase by up to 40% to no more than 260. This departure from previous security strategies is telling in at least two respects. Firstly, once again, in a display of the Johnson government’s ‘sovereignty first’ approach, the UK unilaterally and without consulting its allies changed course on a matter of global importance. Secondly, while the review’s justification of the change in policy is somewhat unconvincing (referring to “developing range of technological and doctrinal threats” p.75), the move does illustrate the current government’s perception of the world as an increasingly dangerous and conflictual place in which the UK will need to play a more assertive role in military terms. The unilateral move belies the references to multilateralism in other parts of the review and risk undermining the UK’s standing with his allies. One expert – quoted in the FT –  lamented the move as “a real blow” to the multilateral process of nuclear disarmament and predicted that it will “cost in terms of the UK’s reputation in nuclear diplomacy.”

 The UK’s ambiguous policy towards China, the unilateral departure from longstanding multilateral commitments, and the general incoherence of the strategy that emerges from the review does not bode well for Global Britain’s relationships with its historical allies in Europe and North America. This is particularly worrying in a situation where relationships with even its closet allies have become fraught due to the issues surrounding the NIP.

The US weighing in on the Northern Ireland Protocol: On the path to international isolation?

The past week has indeed seen tensions around the NIP further escalate. The EU has officially initiated legal action over the UK’s unilateral extension of grace periods on certain goods traded between Britain and Northern Ireland. At the same time, at the occasion of a St Patrick’s day meeting with the Irish Taoiseach, US President Jo Biden and US lawmakers have weighed in on the UK’s approach to the implementation of the NIP. US Lawmakers from both parties have adopted a resolution threatening to block a trade deal between the US and the UK if the terms of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) were not respected. Richard Neal – the head of the House of Representatives’ Ways and Means committee, which is in charge of trade agreements – openly expressed his annoyance and concern about what he described as an emerging pattern in the UK government’s approach to the NIP, which consisted in taking unilateral action and ‘concealing’ it as temporary measures. Similarly, in a joint statement following their Patrick’s day meeting, the US President and the Irish Taoiseach ‘called for the good faith implementation of international agreements designed to address the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland.’

 Cranking up the nationalist rhetoric

Given the incoherent strategy outlined in the Integrative Review, the escalating tensions around the NIP, the US increasing pressure, and the UK government doggedly persisting with its ‘sovereignty first’ approach, there is a risk that the UK will manoeuvre itself into a corner where it will get neither its sovereignty back, nor be able to offset the self-inflicted economic damage resulting from Brexit. However, instead of addressing the issues at hand directly, the government increasingly resorts to an age-old coping strategy for governments under pressure; namely: nationalism.

To deflect international and domestic criticism the government continues to appeal to nationalist resentments by portraying the EU as “bullying” the UK. The UK Government’s insists that its infringements on the Trade and Corporation Agreement (TCA) and the NIP are reasonable temporary measures that are normal in the early implementation period of new international treaties. Referring to healthcare and residency cards for UK nationals in the EU, the government claims that the EU side too “are not yet fulfilling commitments.” Spurred on by Eurosceptic Tory MPs – who called for a halt to payments to the EU agreed on under the divorce bill – the government seizes on every opportunity to portray the EU as the unreasonable side. Thus, this week, several EU countries’ decision to halt the role out of the AstraZeneca vaccine has led the UK government to publicly defend the vaccine – which it tellingly refers to as the “Oxford jab” – and Ursula von der Leyen’s threat to block exports of vaccines manufactured within the EU, has been described as ‘vaccine war.’

The UK government is not necessarily wrong to criticise some of the actions the EU commission and EU member states have taken this week. Yet, the fact that a public health issue is turned into a political issue at the highest level, imbued with nationalist undertones is deeply worrying. The Johnson government tends indeed to turn mundane, social, and economic issues into highly emotional politicised ones, that appeal to nationalist sentiments and conjure ‘us versus them’ thinking. A striking example was the Pick for Britain campaign launched in 2020 to encourage British workers to replace immigrant workers during the fruit and vegetable harvest. The campaign used language that smacked of wartimes propaganda; calling for a ‘land army’ of Brits to “[c]ome help pick for Britain to feed the nation!” While the Pick for Britain campaign was a reaction to Covid-related travel restrictions not Brexit, it reflects the UK Government’s increasingly patriotic and nationalistic rhetoric. The more it becomes clear that delivering on the many promises made during the Brexit campaign will be difficult, the more the government will seek to blame the EU for it so as to sustain anti-European feelings and nationalist sentiments on which it relies to maintain its legitimacy. While this may sound overly dramatic, there is a real possibility that the UK may inadvertently head down a dangerous path of increasing international isolation and nationalist reaction. Indeed, political philosopher Hanna Arendt considered that the sort of politicisation of social questions that we currently observe in the UK rarely ends well.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 14 March 2021

The past week saw the publication of the first official trade figures by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) since the end of the Brexit transition period on January 1st, 2021. As could be expected, the figures show a steep decline in trade with the EU since January and further obstacles to trade are still to be introduced from the EU side next month. This has sparked a debate between the UK government and UK businesses over whether or not the slump is a permanent effect of Brexit or rather a transitory phenomenon, with the government insisting the slump was due to inevitable ‘teething problems.’

 The UK government’s defiant stance is not limited to its relationship with British businesses, but also increasingly marks its interactions with the EU. Different statements and actions by the UK government and David Frost – its minister responsible for EU relations – have led to tensions between the two sides escalating further. The EU is now preparing for a more conflictual approach to managing its relationship with the UK, which may be in the interest of the current UK government, but is likely to damage both the UK economy and the integrity of the United Kingdom in the short- and medium-term.

 Trade: Slump in trade with the EU, delays, and more red tape to come

 The ONS figures on trade show a 40.7% drop in exports of UK goods to the EU, while imports from the EU dropped 28.8%.  Trade with other countries does not show a similar decline over the same period, which indicates that much of the drop is indeed due to Brexit rather than the economic impact of the pandemic.

However, a controversy has erupted over the interpretation of these figures. The UK Government insisted that trade volumes went back to normal in February and that the January slump was largely due to companies’ stockpiling ahead of Brexit as well as some teething problems. Yet, certain sectors – Food producers and hauliers in particular – contest the governments’ figures and interpretation and urge the government to take business concerns over increased barriers to trade seriously. The FT quoted the Chief Executive of the Cold Chain Federation of perishable good producers as saying “I wish the government spent as much time listening to business concerns as they do searching for ways to spin the trade figures.”

 The food industry has already been particularly hard it by Brexit. Thus, seafood exporters for instance reporting a 83% drop in sales to Europe and producers of Stilton cheese have discovered that exporting to the EU is no longer economically viable. Some have started reorienting their business towards North America instead. However, more trade barriers on food-products are still to come. From April 21st the EU – following the agreed timetable – will introduce additional checks on shelf-stable products containing dairy and eggs. This is expected to lead to a very significant increase in paperwork including the need for vet-stamped export health certificates for such products. The consequences will include increasing costs for firms (up to £300,000 a year according to one estimate), and a shortage not just of veterinarians but also customs agents.

The UK governments has reacted by delaying additional sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on products imported from the EU, because the necessary border control posts will not be in place by the original July deadline. Other than that the government mainly reacted by promising support and appeal to the EU – in the words of a spokesperson for the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) – ‘to act pragmatically.’ The Defra’s reaction is representative of other parts of the UK government’s approach to the UK businesses and the EU.

The UK Government’s Post-Brexit Strategy: Nationalism dominates economic and political interests

The differences between the Government and some UK businesses was illustrated this week by calls from business groups and exporters for Brexit Minister David Frost to abandon his abrasive style in dealing with the EU.  

Lord Frost’s first weeks in his new role as Berxit Minster were indeed marked by what EU diplomats and member states perceive as outright “provocations.” The PM’s unilateral decision to extend ‘grace periods’ for the introduction of additional customs checks on supermarket goods and parcels exported from Britain to Northern Ireland was followed by an article by Lord Frost in the Telegraph where Lord Frost accused the EU of ‘sulking’ and of ‘ill will’ towards the UK. Lord Frost’s confrontational style was further illustrated by EU Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič, complaining about Frost not using the ‘hotline’ that was established under Frost’s predecessor Michael Gove to facilitate communication between the UK government and EU commission.

The EU reacted to the extension to the ‘grace periods’ by initiating legal action, but has also started considered other retaliatory measures to prevent the UK government from reneging its commitments under the Trade and Partnership Agreement. According to news reports, EU diplomats chose undiplomatic language to voice their discontent with the UK government’s current approach. One diplomate is quoted as saying  “We can’t accept that we are being taken for granted or being taken for idiots.”

Reportedly, the EU is considering various retaliatory measures, including denying the UK membership of a European legal co-operation pact, further delaying market access for the City of London, and rejecting the UK’s request to join the Lugano Convention, which would ensure the UK’s civil and commercial court judgments are recognised abroad.

 While these possible retaliatory measures are currently only being discussed informally, they do illustrate just how fraught the relationships between the UK and the EU have become. Between the pressures from UK businesses, the EU, and the pro-Brexit Tory constituency that brought Boris Johnson to power, the government resolutely chooses the path that keeps the latter happy – whatever the impact on its relationship with two former.

 The Johnson government’s abrasive relationships with business is in keeping with the attitude its most senior representatives have adopt for some time. During his time as Foreign Secretary in the May government, the now PM made it clear that business interests were secondary; famously replying ‘F**k business’ to a question about business interests under his favoured hard Brexit strategy.

 UK businesses themselves, however, remain divided over Brexit and over the best approach for the UK government to take. Unsurprisingly, depending on how reliant different businesses are on the Single Market, or how vulnerable to competition from the EU in the home market, businesses seem to be more or less supportive of a hard line towards Brussels. Recent academic research found that the fragmentation and division of the UK business elite over its stance towards Brexit is a key reason why Brexit happened in the first place.

 The UK government’s seemingly unheeding approach towards its relationships with the EU is not necessarily irrational though. One businessman is on record saying “Adopting a ‘madman’ negotiating strategy might be great politics, but it’s terrible for food supply chains."  A senior Tory goes as far as suggesting that Lord Frosts appointment was a deliberate attempt by the PM to have “a row with the EU.” It is indeed hard to avoid the conclusion that many of the Government’s actions towards the EU – such as denying full diplomatic status to the EU’s mission in the UK – were motivated by anything else than an attempt to provoke a strong reaction. Keeping emotions running high allows the UK government to continue the strategy that brought it to power in the first place and that crucially hinged on portraying the EU as a “bully” and the source of the UK’s problems. Thus, sabotaging the emerging relationship with the EU post-Brexit constitutes a way of maintaining popular support for the government without having to find a new source of legitimation now that Brexit has happened.

So far, the strategy seems to work. Together with a successful Covid19 vaccination campaign, stirring nationalistic resentments against the EU may help the government regaining some of the popularity lost due to the initially botched Covid19-response. According to YouGov ratings of the PM’s performance have gone up from 34% in October to 41% in February 2021 with the number of people answering that he is doing badly as PM declining from 59% to 52%. The strategy also receives strong support from within the party: Tory grandees like Ian Duncan Smith blame the EU for ‘bullying’ Britain and support Lord Frost’s tough stance.

 The ultimate consequences of this political strategy may be dire for two reasons, however.

 For one, the UK government’s repeated violation of international agreements that it signed only a few months earlier – as happened before with the Internal Market Bill and now again with the unilateral extension of the ‘grace periods’ – undermines its credibility as a reliable partner respectful of the rule of law. Beyond the moral issues involved, this may ultimately have very concrete consequences of the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit. While the post-Brexit relationship with the EU will always be subject to re-negotiation and regular updating of agreements, the current TCA was signed for five years, which provides citizens and business on both sides with some planning certainty. Yet, the UK government’s continuous disregard for various provisions contained in the TCA, means that Brexit is more likely to become a situation of constant political negotiations and legal action, rather than a more stable and certain state where the relationship is settled and governed by international treaties for a number of years.

 For the other, and more immediately, if the UK persists with the extension of ‘grace periods’ for goods shipped from Britain to Norther Ireland, the EU might find itself very soon manoeuvred into a corner where it faces the choice between imposing border checks on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic – and thus jeopardising the achievements of the peace process –, or refraining from imposing such checks and thus undermining the integrity of its Single Market regarding product standards. The latter move would arguably constitute a major overstepping of the EU’s own ‘red lines’ and an existential threat to its Single Market. Conversely, jeopardising the peace process in Northern Ireland is something the EU wanted to avoid at all cost – not least because of US pressure to save the Good Friday Agreement. Given that legal action over the breach of the TCA will take between one and two years, we are headed towards a first ‘moment of truth’ where the EU is pushed by the UK government into making a very difficult choice.

 This situation may be the result of a conscious strategy the UK government. The PM visited Northern Ireland this week in an attempt to mend the strained relationships with the unionists. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) First Minister Arlene Foster increasingly insists that the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) needs to be abandoned to protect the integrity of the UK. In this context, forcing the EU into making a choice between the integrity of its Single Market and abandoning the key stipulation of the NIP that there cannot be a physical border on the Island of Ireland, may be an attempt  by the UK government to force the EU into renegotiating the NIP.

 Whatever happens to the extension of the grace periods, it is likely that the relationship between the EU and the UK will worsen in the coming months. As long as the nationalist fringe of the Tory party remains in control, it is also likely that political interests will continue to dominate economic ones – unless of course the economic pain resulting from the hard Brexit strategy becomes too acute.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 7 March 2021

This week’s Brexit-related news saw more evidence emerging that trade in goods is considerably affected by Brexit. At the same time, in search for its place in the post-Brexit world economy, the UK Government continues down the path of a ‘hard Brexit’ approach, which sees the government adopt a rather confrontational stance towards the EU and pursuing regulatory reforms that focus on Global competition rather than seeking continuing alignment with European standards.

Trade – teething problems or permanent shift?

As more EU countries publish their trade figures for the beginning of the year, it seems increasingly clear that Brexit has led to reduced trade between Britain and the EU beyond the impact of the Covid19 pandemic. The French customs office reported a decline a decline of 13% of French exports to the UK and a 20% decline of imports from the UK. This is in the context of otherwise raising trade activity in France in January 2021.

Brexit is also reshaping the shipping routes between Ireland, Great Britain, and the European continent. In order to avoid new custom checks and red tape at the EU-British borders, shipping companies have increased capacity on the – longer – routes linking the Republic of Ireland directly to the continent while reducing services on the shorter ‘land link’ via Great Britain.

The UK government, however, maintains that trade volumes are back to normal after a sort slump immediately after the end of the transition period on January 1st, 2021.

It is of course still too early to know whether any of these changes in trading patterns will be permanent or are simply the result of companies still having to adapt to the new formalities that were introduced at very short notice.

The emerging relationship with the EU – between nostalgia and humility?

A more important issue that continues to make the headlines is the emerging relationship between the UK and the EU.

A recent study by a group of researchers at King’s College London and Harvard, investigated how the ‘Global Britain’ slogan may be transformed into an actual policy after Brexit. The report points out the inherent ambiguous nature of term, which seeks to signal openness and international orientation, while smacking of nostalgia for Britain’s lost imperial power. The authors – based on interviews with politicians and civil servants in the UK and overseas – suggest that to be successful the Global Britain narrative needs to be outward looking and collaborative not adversarial, humble not arrogant, and appeal to both international and domestic audiences. Yet, this week’s developments in various areas suggest that the UK Government currently is not inclined to adopt a collaborative and humble approach towards the EU. The Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) and financial market regulations are two cases in point.

Northern Ireland Protocol

This week, the UK Government unilaterally decided to extend the so-called “grace period” on the introduction of border checks on agri-food products and parcels entering Northern Ireland from Britain. The full set of checks and procedures – agreed between the UK government and the EU under the NIP – was due to be introduced by April, but has now been pushed by the UK to October. Unsurprisingly, the EU’s reaction was robust, calling the move a breach of international law and announced that it would take legal action. The UK’s new “Brexit Minister”, in return, accused the EU of ‘ill will’ insisting that the UK’s unilateral move was in accordance with the NIP.

The continuing issues surrounding the implementation of the NIP stoke further tensions between Unionists and Nationalists in the NI Assembly, but also undermine the UK Government’s credibility in further negotiations with the EU. Thus, the Irish Foreign Minister publicly state that the UK could not be trusted in further post-Brexit talks.

Regulatory alignment with the EU – financial services

One crucial area in which the UK has started initiating important post-Brexit reforms concerns financial services.  This week, Lord Hill has published a review of UK stock market listing requirements. The review makes it clear that the main goal of post-Brexit financial regulations is not primarily financial stability, but rather maintaining London’s competitiveness as a global financial centre. Indeed, the review suggests “that it would be helpful if the FCA [the financial Conduct Authority – UK’s financial market regulator] was also charged with the duty of taking expressly into account the UK’s overall attractiveness as a place to do business.” As such, the review has been seen as part of a ‘post-Brexit fightback by the City of London.’

Substantively, the review suggests a series of relaxations of the London Stock Exchange listing requirements. The most consequential recommendations concern the minimal level of free float and dual class shares. Regarding the former, the review suggests that the the number of shares that can be publicly traded and are not held by an insider (‘free float’) should be reduced from 25% to 15%. This implies that the founders of a company can maintain a larger influence over the business after it is publicly listed. Similarly, allowing shares with different voting rights (dual class shares) to be listed on the Premium segment would also implies founders could potentially maintain control over the company by controlling shares with higher voting rights than listed shares. This would allow founders – for instance – to prevent a hostile takeover.

Furthermore, the review suggests relaxations that would make it possible for Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) to list in London. Spacs – also referred to as ‘blank-cheque companies – are companies that list on a stock exchange based on a promise to acquire a non-specified private firm and take it public. Spcas have become an important growth market in the US over the past year and the UK government is keen on London becoming an attractive market for such companies.

Taken together these changes would make the LSE a much more attractive place for companies to list – in particular high-growth tech companies which have increasingly chosen Hong Kong and New York over London.

A key question is what the proposed changes would mean in terms of regulatory alignment with the EU, which is key for the UK to obtain recognition as equivalent to EU in regulatory terms and thus maintain access for UK financial service firms to the EU single market.

Lord Hill insists that “this report is not about opening up a gap between us and other global centres by proposing radical new departures to try to seize a competitive advantage. It is about closing a gap which has opened up” (p.10) and that “[i]t makes no sense to think in terms of ‘ripping everything up’ or that we should diverge for the sake of diverging. We clearly need to maintain the high standards of investor protection for which the UK is known” (p.4).

However, reactions to the Hill Review were very mixed. Important investors voiced concern over the weakening investor protections and changes seemingly driven by a rush to participate in the current Spacs frenzy. Indeed, the proposed measures can be considered to shift power from minority shareholders to insiders and thus increasing risks for minority shareholders. As such, the changes may be interpreted as initiating a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of investor protection.

Be that as it may, the proposed changes clearly deviate from EU regulations, for instance in terms of the recommendations for changes to the prospectus requirements, where Lord Hill freely admits that they “would take us closer to the kind of system we had before the Prospectus Directive and Regulation were introduced in the EU.” Indeed, according to the FT, Sir Martin Sorrell, Founder of S4Capital digital market and advertising business (which has a dual-class share structure), approvingly considered that the review “signals that the government’s ‘Singapore on Thames’ vision for a post-Brexit Britain is on the way to becoming a reality.”

Clearly then, regulatory alignment with the EU does not seem to be a priority for the UK Government, which will almost certainly eliminate any chance of the UK financial market obtaining regulatory equivalence status from the EU Commission. At the same time, the approach is in line with the UK government’s current adversarial rather than collaborative approach to its emerging relationship with the EU in other areas too. This approach, may reflect the fact that the UK Government is confident that its ‘Global Britain’ strategy can work regardless of its impact on the relationship with the EU.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 28 February 2021

This week has seen a series of interesting news related to Brexit. Four key elements start to emerge has important factors potentially determining the direction of travel of the UK post-Brexit. Firstly, the UK Government’s preferences regarding the market access versus sovereignty trade-off; Secondly, and not unrelated, the strategic decision for the UK on whether to engage in a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ with the EU or a geographic ‘race to the East;’ Thirdly, the role of the state in the economy post-Brexit; and fourthly, the coinciding of Brexit with the Covid19 pandemic.

Sovereignty v. market access

Two news items this week suggest that the current UK government will maintain its ‘hard Brexit’ stance even in its approach to establishing a new relationship with the EU.

In the area of energy, UK energy producers have waited for some time for the UK government to announce its new carbon trading scheme. The FT reported that energy producers were increasingly worried about the prospect of the UK carbon emissions trading scheme not being linked to the EU’s scheme. Indeed, the government is yet to determine key aspects of the new scheme, most importantly the price at which carbon emissions will be traded. So far, the government has not committed to linking its scheme to the EU scheme. Significantly, a policy White Paper published in December 2020 acknowledges the possibility of international linkages of the new UK scheme, but does not mention the EU as a particularly likely partner. The uncertainty created by the absence of clarity on carbon trading prices, increasingly worries energy companies, but the government does not seem keen on alignment with the EU in this area.

In the area of financial market regulation, the media reported this week on a first draft of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the UK and EU are currently negotiating and which it is hoped will be signed by the end of March. According to the FT, the MoU explicitly contains a statement that “[t]he regulatory dialogue should not restrict the ability of either jurisdiction to implement regulatory or other legal measures that it considers appropriate.” This suggests, once again, that market access does not seem to be a key priority in these discussions. The impression that the current UK government strongly values sovereignty over market access is reinforced by statements made by the Governor of the Bank of England in relation to the EU’s purported attempts to force clearing of EUR denominated trade to take place within the EU from next year, suggest that in this area too, the British side is currently minded to accept a loss of market access in exchange for the ability to diverge significantly from EU rules.

Race to the bottom – or race to the East?

The ‘sovereignty approach’ to the post-Brexit relationships with the EU implies necessarily that UK companies will lose access to the EU’s single market. It therefore raises important questions about alternative markets UK companies may be able to access. Two basic – not mutually exclusive – strategies are emerging here: firstly, seeking increased competitiveness through regulatory competition with the EU by deregulating and attracting investors to Britain; or seeking to create closer ties with other geographic regions – in particular rapidly growing Asian markets – through bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.

Speaking at the National Farmers Union (NFU) annual conference, Trade Secretary Liz Truss announced this week a new governmental programme called ‘Open Doors campaign,’ which suggests that the geographic orientation towards East is an important part of the UK governments strategy in making up for the reduced access to the UK market. The programme seeks to support UK food and beverage businesses in reorienting their exports towards the increasing large middle-class consumers in Asian countries. Pre-Brexit, 60% of a total of £23bn in UK food and beverage exports went to the EU (2019 figures). This figure is bound to decline given numerous non-tariff trade barriers that are hampering food exports to the continent. Whether or not exports to Asian countries will compensate for the decline in exports to Europe will also depend on future trade agreements with countries in that region. Already in January, the UK has applied to join the Asia-Pacific free trade area CPTPP. Joining this regional agreement would help the governments geographic reorientation strategy. Whether membership of the CPTPP would make a material difference in the short run and allow exporters to compensate the expected losses from reduced trade with the EU is not certain. Currently, UK exports to the 11 CPTPP member states corresponded with 8.4% of GDP in 2019, approximately the same as the UK exports to Germany – and that in spite of the fact that the UK already has free trade agreements with 7 of the 11 member countries.

There was also some news this week, that indicate that the UK government will be pushed to play the regulatory competition card as well. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) urged the government to reduce the capital requirements for UK Insurers – that were set by the EU’s Solvency II regulation – and to simplify reporting requirements. This would constitute a considerable divergence from EU financial market regulation and almost certainly kill any hopes that the EU may still grant the UK equivalence status. However, the ABI clearly sees an opportunity to benefit from Brexit that would compensate for the loss of access to the single market. Whether or not that calculation is correct remains to be seen; what this push does suggest though is that certain industries may put considerable pressure on the government to go down the route of diverging from EU regulations rather than remaining closely aligned. This will add further incentives – besides more ideological ones – for politicians to choose sovereignty over market access. It may also create tensions between different sectors in the financial industry, with UK banks publishing a report this week that urges to government to work towards regulatory convergence not just with the EU, but globally.

State intervention

Another set of news that reach us this week was that the government is likely to take a very active role in reshaping the UK economy after Brexit.

Thus, already in November, the Chancellor had announced the establishment of a new public Infrastructure Bank, which will make up for the loss of access to the European Investment Bank (EIB). This week, ahead of the 2021 budget, the Chancellor specified that £12bn in capital investment and £10bn in loan guarantees would be committed to this new public bank. It remains unclear, however, what exactly the remit of the bank will be and therefore whether it will be able to live up to its potential.

The government also announced a new Standard Buyer Loan Guarantee (SBLG), under which the UK government guarantees loans of up to £30m by UK lenders to overseas buyers of UK products and services. This scheme is meant to boost exports by small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).

Together with another – Brexit-unrelated – announcement of state investment in high-growth firms through a new ‘Future Fund’ of £375m, it seems increasingly clear that the UK government does not shy away from a very hands-on role in the economy to shape the UK economy’s post-Brexit future.

 Covid a blessing for Brexiteers?

Finally, another aspect of Brexit that becomes increasingly clear is that contrary to what some may have expected, Brexit is not over but a process that has just begun. As such, politically too, Brexit is not settled – as many had hoped – with the departure of the UK from the EU, but it will remain a politically important issue for decades to come. In this respect, for the advocates of Brexit the coincidence of the end of the transition period with the Covid19 pandemic – and hence one of the most severe economic crises in living memory – may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Indeed, while carefully designed academic studies may one day be able to disentangle the economic impact of Brexit from the economic impact of the pandemic, in the political arena it is unlikely that the two will ever be kept completely separated. A striking example was this week’s announcement of Italy’s trade figures. Italy is the first major EU economy to publish its trade figures for January 2021. They show a stunning 70% drop in imports from the UK. To be sure, much of this decline can be attributed to the pandemic. Yet, comparing this decline to that other countries exports to Italy have suffered, suggests that Brexit-related disruptions played a very major role. For instance, Italian imports from China, Russia, and Switzerland declined by less than 10%. Yet, in the political arena such subtleties can easily be forgotten and ultimately in public discourse the impact of Brexit may remain confounded with the impact of the pandemic. This may turn out to become an important element in future political discussions about the UK’s relationship with the EU.

Brexit Impact Tracker - 21 February 2021

This past week has seen further developments that provide interesting glimpses into what the future relationship between the EU and the UK may look like after Brexit.

Data Protection

Regarding data protection regulation, Brussels has granted the UK data protection regulation ‘equivalence’ status. This means, UK data protection regulations are considered equivalent to EU standards and data can continue flowing across the channel. This decision was important in particular for industries where data exchange across borders are particularly important - such as the insurance industry – and for law enforcement cooperation. While this is certainly good news, like in financial services – where the EU currently refuses to grant UK regulation equivalence status – this decision can be unilaterally revoked. Indeed, the commission has announced regular checks and a review after four years. This reinforces a trend that was to be expected once the terms of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) had become clear, namely, that the UK would be locked into a system where the UK government can choose to deviate from EU regulation, but will lose market access as a result. The two months since Brexit have clearly shattered any illusions that “taking back control” can be done without considerable costs.

Trade Barriers

A recent survey by IHS Markit amongst UK manufacturing companies found further evidence that the new non-tariff trade barriers have a real impact on UK exporters. A majority of companies reported export losses and disruptions to their supply chains due to Brexit. The manufacturing sectors is thus another sector that reports a considerable negative impact from Brexit, after other sectors – in particular fishing and seafood – have struggled with very considerable disruption.

Free movement of labour

There is also an increasing number of sectors that are mainly negatively impacted due to the new restrictions on free movement of labour across UK-EU borders. This week, growers of ornamental flowers have issued a stark warning that part of the harvest of daffodils and other spring flowers will be lost due to their inability to recruit the required number of pickers. While the government has adopted a seasonal workers pilot scheme, which guarantees that UK food producers can continue drawing on EU workers for harvesting, ornamental plants do not fall under this scheme. The impact is potentially large for a sector where pre-Brexit more than half of the pickers were recruited from EU countries.

Governance and UK’s international relations

The most significant news around Brexit in the past week, however, concerned the appointed on Wednesday of David Frost – UK’s chief Brexit negotiator – to a cabinet position in order to coordinate the UK-EU relationships.

This is a remarkable move in several respects: For one, many commentators were quick to point out the irony in Lord Frost – an unelected civil servant – joining the Cabinet Office as a Minister of State.

More importantly, the appointment of a Cabinet Minister in charge of EU relationships raises important questions about the governance structure that will govern both the TCA and the UK’s relationships with the EU more broadly. In particular, managing the relationship between the UK and EU countries like France and Germany is currently the role of the Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. While part of Lord Frost’s brief will also overlap with Secretary of State for International Trade Liz Truss’s portfolio. Some observers fear that Lord Frost’s appointment risks duplicating some of these relationships and creating confusion over the respective responsibilities of Lord Frost, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and the Department for International Trade. It remains to be seen how these uncertainty will affect the UK’s negotiation position at a time when it becomes increasingly clear that the EU will treat the UK mainly like the competitor it now has become for the block and is not inclined to grant the UK any easy victories.

Most importantly perhaps, Lord Frost will replace Michael Gove as co-chair of the Joint Committee overseeing the implementation of the TCA. This comes at a time where Gove has just started delicate talks with the EU side over the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. So far, Lord Frost has mainly made a name for himself as a staunch advocate of an inflexible hard-line approach to Brexit. He’s credited for the hard Brexit strategy of PM Johnson, a very minimal trade deal, while reportedly also convincing the PM back in December to threaten to break international law with an Internal Market Bill that would have overruled parts of the Brexit agreement. As such, Lord Frost does not seem like the person who will seek to appease the growing tensions with the EU over various issues including the NIP, the ‘regulatory equivalence’ of the City of London, and a possible renegotiation of the rules governing exports of shellfish. Indeed, the unexpected appointment may signal that PM Johnson’s vision for the relationship with the EU remains one that favours sovereignty over market access even when it entails tensions and conflicts with Brussels.

Brexit Impact Tracker – 14 February 2021

Week six after Brexit continues to be dominated by discussions about the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), stories about disruptions to exports, and changes in patterns of trading in financial products; but also the emergence of stories about companies benefiting from the UK’s exit of the single market.

The Northern Ireland Protocol

Discussions between the British Government and the EU Commission continued about the implementation of the NIP. The tone continues to be ‘robust’ on both sides with the FT citing one EU diplomat’s rather undiplomatic statement that ‘[i]t would already be a step forward if Britain put as much energy into the implementation of the NI protocol as it puts into complaining about it,’ while Michael Gove blamed the EU to follow an ‘integrationist theology.’ A joint statement following a meeting on Thursday 12th of February, between Gove and the Commission’s vice president Maroš Šefčovič, unsurprisingly did not hint at much progress in the talks, with the EU insisting on a full implementation of the protocol and the UK appealing to ‘pragmatism.’

The substantial issues seem to remain unsolvable. The best the UK side currently seems to be hoping for is an extension to the various ‘grace periods’ accorded to certain products before full custom checks are introduced. The EU side makes such extensions dependent on the UK first fully implementing the existing rules. Meanwhile, unionists in Northern Ireland remain hostile to the NIP and the post-Brexit trade agreement in general. DUP leader and First Minister Arlene Foster stated that a ‘more rigorous implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol is “not going to work”.’ It is currently difficult to see how the UK government can successfully navigate between the imperative of not jeopardising the Good Friday Agreement, reducing disruption to trade between the UK and Northern Ireland, while delivering on the promise of the UK exiting the single market without overstepping Brussel’s read lines.

Non-tariff trade barriers: Rotting fish and meat

Stories about the impact of the new non-tariff barriers to trade also continue to emerge, from tons of rotting UK meat at the EU boarders, to continuing problems with seafood and fish exports, notably due to insufficient water quality in parts of the UK.

Simultaneously, several industry bodies have started producing member surveys that give a sense of the impact of Brexit on trade during the first month after the end of the transition period. The Road Haulage Association (RHA) reports a drop of 68% of volume of trade compared to January 2020. Similarly, the British Chambers of Commerce’s (BCC) member survey found that 49% of UK exporters surveyed face problems with the new rules.  

The Government contests some of these figures and speaks of teething problems, while suggesting export levels were nearly back to normal by February. At the same time, the lorry queues many feared would form in Kent following Brexit did not materialise, although this may precisely be due to the decreased economic activity due to Covid19 and the anticipation of disruptions.

One interesting figure that has been widely reported, is that 50 to 60 per cent of lorries returning to the EU from the UK are empty. This hints at a certain imbalance in the impact of Brexit on the two parties, with EU firms exporting more goods to the UK than UK exporters sending back to the EU. This of course may be due that the UK has adopted a gradual approach to introducing boarder checks with full checks only to be in place by July 1st, 2021.

Equity trading and finance

Another story that hit the news was the shift in trading of European shares and derivatives from London to Amsterdam and other stock exchanges inside the EU. For the first time, the value of stocks traded on Euronext Amsterdam surpassed the volume traded on the London Stock Exchange. This is a highly symbolic moment that observers and some industry insiders see as the beginning of London losing its status as undisputed financial centre in Europe. Others, however, do not see this shift as much more than symbolic and do not consider it having a major impact on jobs in the City of London.

The change in trading patterns of financial products does indicate though that the UK is now facing a crossroads and has to decided whether it will seek to negotiate a formal agreement with the EU that would re-establish and enshrine the recognition of regulatory equivalence of its financial sector in a formal agreement, or whether to go its own way by deviating from EU financial regulations to attract business that cannot take place inside the EU. One example of the latter has been provided by the UK allowing trading in Swiss stocks currently banned from EU exchanges.

The Winners

Finally, while the media are dominated by negative news about the impact of Brexit, we should not forget that not all sectors are negatively impacted and that there will necessarily be winners as well as losers. The FT reported an interesting geographical effect of Brexit, whereby ports in the North of the country benefit from changing shipping routes following Brexit, as exporters from the EU are seeking to avoid congested ports in the South.

Another element potentially leading to a positive effect of Brexit on certain sectors and locations, relates to the fact that wherever trade barriers are erected, incentives to establish operations ‘behind’ the barriers are increased. In other words, the new trade barriers may create incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the UK. Indeed, all the negative headlines about disruption to exports and trade may presage that companies will look into restructuring their supply chains to avoid such disruptions. There have already been reports of UK companies setting up shop inside the EU and thus reducing their operations in the UK accordingly. However, EU companies will of course consider doing the same thing in the opposite direction. With a population of nearly 67m people, the UK remains an attractive market for many consumer and manufacturing goods destined for the UK market, which may encourage EU companies from certain sectors to set up operations in the UK to avoid the trade barriers.

It is unlikely that this effect will completely off set the expected decline in FDI, which is mainly driven by the loss of attractiveness of the UK for companies from outside the EU who establish operations in the UK to export to the EU single market. Nevertheless, for certain sectors and regions, the increased trade barriers may mean an increase in FDI. The precise pattern of these changes in motives for FDI and its differential impact on different sectors and regions will depend on the evolution of the trade arrangements and will take time to materialise.

Brexit Impact Tracker – 05 February 2021

A lot of speculation has taken place in the past five years around the impact of Brexit on the EU and UK economies, societies, and politics. Much of the debate took place in a politically heated and acrimonious context, which was not conducive to a level-headed analysis of what the impact of Brexit might be. Five weeks after the end of the Brexit transition period, stories start emerging about the actual impact of Brexit on the British and EU economies, societies, and politics. Until we have enough data to carry out systematic scientific studies, these news stories will be an important source of information. Little by little these stories will form a picture that will allow us to assess the accuracy of the promises made and fears expressed in a hugely emotional and political process since the referendum campaign was launched in early 2016. By keeping track of these stories, the Brexit Impact Tracker seeks to contribute to this important task.
This blog does not pretend to be exhaustive, but collects those stories that seemed particularly important, interesting, unexpected, and consequential to us (comments on stories we missed out on are of course welcome). We focus on news items, expert and journalistic comments, and emerging academic work and seek to summarise the key developments while providing some comment to contextualise them.

This first post of the BIT summarises some of the key stories that have emerged since the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021.

Short-term trade disruption due to new non-tariff trade barriers and taxes

The first accounts of disruption to cross-Channel trade emerged soon after the end of the transition period. Various online retailers stopped exporting to the UK altogether due to increased costs and/or uncertainties around value-added tax (VAT); and UK consumers complained about unexpected additional charges on goods ordered from the EU. Some companies stopped trading across the Channel in the short term to get to grips with the new trading regime, for which they only had seven days to prepare. More worrying are stories about the possibility of UK companies having to establish warehouses and sales hubs inside the EU to service the EU market more efficiently. At least in one case this has led to the scrapping of plans to invest in warehouse capacity in the UK. Of course, this trend may be counterbalanced by EU firms deciding to adopt a similar strategy to service the UK market and avoid increased VAT payments. The overall impact on employment in the UK will not be known for a while.

Northern Ireland Protocol

The by far most serious event around Brexit in the past week or so were political tensions arising from the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), which aimed at avoiding a new physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Such a border was deemed a key threat to the achievements of the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement. Two major events in the past week exposed the fragility of the solution enshrined in the NIP:

In the midst of a row between the EU and one of the main Covid-19 vaccine producers over the delivery of vaccines to EU member states, the EU Commission decided to trigger Article 16 of the NIP, which allows either party to override the NIP and thus impose customs control between NI and the Republic. This decision was motivated by the fear that vaccines could leave the EU via the land border between the Republic and NI. While this drastic step was taken without broad consultation and quickly reversed, the political damage of this ‘blunder’ is considerable, because it undermines the EU’s own insistence throughout the Brexit process that establishing a board between NI and the Republic would be disastrous.

At the same time, local councils in NI temporarily suspended new border checks at Belfast and Larne ports after menacing behaviour and threats by unionists sparked concerns over safety of customs staff. Simultaneously, the DUP and other unionist forces urged the UK Government to invoke Article 16 of the NIP to guaranteed that there would be no non-tariff barriers impose on trade between NI and the Great Britain and thus no boarder in the Irish Sea would be established. However, the existence of such checks is a necessary for NI to remain inside the EU customs Union and for a border between NI and the Republic to be avoided.

This week’s events around the NIP show how fragile and potentially devastating for the Union the solution is that had been a crucial element in sealing the Brexit Deal.

The Environment

Another news story that emerged soon after the end of the transition period was that the UK Government – contrary to reassurances prior to Brexit – decided to temporarily lift a ban on certain pesticides banned in the EU due to their known negative impact on bees and other wildlife. This decision contrasts to some extent with the New Agriculture Act 2020, passed in November 2020, which marked a departure from the EU’s environmentally harmful Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Most importantly, the Agriculture Act makes it possible for farmers and landowners to receive public money not just for food production, but also for the delivery of public goods – such as wildlife. This may provide a glimpse of things to come in the area of environmental protection: Freed from the constraints of the CAP the UK has leeway to significantly improve its approach to the environment and wildlife, but is also more likely to adopt policies to please small, but vocal interest groups such as sugar beet farmers and the British Sugar when it seems political opportune.

Financial Services

The Financial Services industry was largely neglected in the TCA. Instead, the UK government and the EU currently rely on a so-called ‘equivalence regime,’ where mutual market access depends on both partners recognising the other’s regulatory regime to be of equivalent standard. If the UK decided to depart from the current standard to go its own way after Brexit, Brussels could unilaterally withdraw market access to London-based financial services firms.
Interestingly, a similar ‘equivalence regime’ between the EU and Switzerland had let to a ban on trading in Swiss stock in the EU, after the EU revoked the recognition that Swiss supervisory regulation was equivalent to EU regulation in 2019. It was announced this week that after Brexit, the will lifted the ban and trading in Swiss stock in London is expected to resume.
For the UK, the Swiss example may provide a cautionary tale in terms of regulatory competition with the EU in the area of financial services. However, in an interesting interview, Barclay’s CEO Jes Staley made the case for the UK not to go down the deregulation route. Indeed, while the government has repeatedly promised a “bonfire” of red tape and regulations as one of the main benefits of Brexit, Staley insisted on the competitive advantage a high level of regulatory standards provides for the City of London. Indeed, he insisted that he “wouldn’t burn one piece of regulation.” This is an interesting development and challenges the wide-spread idea that less regulation is always better for business. For some business strategies, regulations are necessary to deliver high-quality services and products. This insight seems generally accepted by British businesses not just in the financial industry but also in manufacturing, but not amongst politicians, which may lead to interesting discussions after Brexit.

Fish & Seafood

Fisheries – and specifically fishing quotas in British waters – were high up on the Brexit priority list and one of the key sticking points of the TCA negotiations. Ironically, while agreement on quotas was key to making the TCA possible, the deal does not seem to do the industry much good. Rather, the Seafood and Fish industries seem to be among the hardest hit sectors by the new trading arrangements between the UK and the EU. The new non-tariff trade barriers in the form of customs declarations and checks, affect the perishable seafood exports strongly, as time to market has increased from between 12h to 24h to a multiple of that. Stories have emerged o British Seafood delivers arriving in EU countries in bad condition, which has started adversely affecting the reputation of UK companies in the sector. The new regimes involving large amounts of paper work, also implies increased costs for businesses. The increased workload may of course also lead to companies that can afford it creating new posts for administrators dealing with the paperwork, although given the small size of the sector, this is unlikely to have any significant impact on employment at a national level.

Cars

For the car manufacturing industry, the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) concluded on Christmas Eve 2020 has secured continuation of tariff-free exports under certain conditions. The key condition are so called Rules of Origin (RoO) whereby for electric- and hybrid vehicles a minimum of 40% of a finished car’s value needs to be produce inside the EU or UK (increasing to 55% bey 2027); for internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) the corresponding figure is 55%.
The conclusion of the TCA has led Nissan to announce their commitment production at its Sunderland plant, whose survival was threatened by a no-deal Brexit. This good news story, has to be qualified however: Nissan decision was made possible by its exclusive contract with battery producer Envision, which is crucial for the company to be able to produce within the RoOs contained in the TCA. Yet, the UK’s capacity in EV batteries is limited and will be a crucial challenge for most other car manufacturers operating in the UK. Given the RoOs and the important contribution of batteries to the overall value of EVs, the future of UK EV manufacturing will crucially hinge on the UK’s ability to build its own capacity in battery production for EVs, rather than relying on imports from Asia or the US. Here, the TCA may provide some opportunities in the sense that foreign car manufacturers may be incentivised to move their battery production from non-EU countries to the UK in order to continue benefiting from tariff-free exports to the EU market. The urgency to build battery manufacturing capacity is increased by the government’s announcement of a ban on internal combustion engine vehicles from 2030, which will likely lead to a rapid decline in traditional car manufacturing.