It is official: From tomorrow, Liz Truss will be our new Prime Minister (PM) and will form the third conservative government since the Referendum in June 2016, which is expected to be dominated by Brexiters. 0.43% of the British electorate have decided she gets to run the country for the next two years.* Actually, it may not even be 0.43% of the British electorate, because the Conservative party allows people who are not on the electoral register to become members and enjoy full member benefits – including voting in the party leadership contest. So, we do not really know who and how many people decided about the top job in British politics.
Given these – and other – concerns, Tortoise Media wrote a letter to Darren Mott, the CEO of the conservative party asking nine questions about the Tory Party membership and the election of its leader. Mott’s response, which can be found here, states that “[t]he [conservative] Party is not a public body and it does not carry out public functions” and that therefore he is “declining to answer [Tortoise’s] questions in detail.” This in turn led Tortoise to threaten the party with a request for judicial review to obtain the information sought. While, according to David Allen Green, that request has little chance of success, the questions Tortoise is asking are disturbing. They include an explanation why non-UK citizens are allowed to vote in the leadership contest, whether people under the legal voting age can vote, and why taxpayer-funded GCHQ was involved in organising the distribution ballots for the leadership contest. So much for ‘the will of the people.’
Of course, conservatives – but even some commentators and journalists – will claim that this is perfectly normal, as it is how our ‘parliamentary-’ – as opposed to ‘presidential democracy’ – works. For instance, Gus O’Donnell on the excellent new News Agent podcast argued that the direct election of the PM by the people was not part of British politics, and that while that may have drawbacks, other political systems too have their shortcomings. Indeed, as the FullFact web page shows, it is the norm that British PMs take office without there being a GE. That is often justified by the fact that what people vote for in a GE is not a PM but a party with a given manifesto, which indirectly confers democratic legitimacy to whoever leads that party. As Prof. Alison Young points out, the rub, of course, is this: It is hard to make that argument about the democratic mandate of the party – as opposed to the PM themselves – when the policies the party stands for change compared to what was promised during the previous GE. In the present case, since the last GE in December 2019 the world has changed considerably and conservative manifesto pledges have been broken left, right, and centre. The policy agenda Johnson got elected on (essentially ‘get Brexit done’), is not the same as Truss’s agenda. As far as we can tell, the policies Truss promises are essentially tax cuts, ‘unashamedly’ pro-growth deregulatory policies at the expense of environmental and social protections, and confrontational international policies towards Russia, but also the EU and China.
This agenda may be what the people want, but there is no way of knowing as voters will not be asked to approve the new government’s agenda. As noted above, this may not be particularly shocking to British citizens who are used to the country’s peculiar form of democracy. Yet, given the fake-populist leanings of Brexiters and their constant reference to the ‘will of the people’ when it comes to Brexit, the fact that only a tiny fraction of the electorate gets to decide who will run the country for the next two years and take it into a distinctly different direction from the 2019 manifesto promises seems somewhat odd. So, next time Brexiters insist on the will of the people, let us remember how we got the government that we have.
Brexiter government 3 – ‘Weak and wobbly’ from the start?
The policy challenges PM Truss is facing are nothing short of extraordinary. Academics estimate that if nothing is done, more than half (!!) of UK households will be in fuel poverty by January 2023; Europe is in the middle of its greatest security crisis since World War 2 including the threat of an impending nuclear calamity greater than Chernobyl; and the UK’s relationship with the EU is extremely precarious notably because of the issues around the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP). Over the weekend, the Telegraph’s Janet Daley argued that this may actually mean Truss will be in a stronger position that we all think. According to her, Brits do not expect their politicians to be superheroes and forgive failure in the best of times due to their natural ‘fairmindedness.’
So, due to the very low expectations, will Truss actually be a more solid PM than we think. Somehow, the party-internal dynamics and power relations make me doubt that. We know that Truss has become PM while only being the first choice of roughly one third of the Tory MPs. Indeed, the last round of voting by MPs, before the two remaining candidates were put to the members vote, split the Tory MPs into three roughly equal groups supporting Truss, Sunak, and Mordaunt; Truss with 113 votes was actually significantly trailing Sunak with 137 votes. So, she clearly will not have particularly strong and enthusiastic support from within the Conservative party. Similarly, even before taking office Truss is lacking the support of the British electorate. In the absence of broad public and party internal support, Truss will have to particularly rely on the support of those within the party who brought her to power, i.e. the far right in the party gathered in the European Research Group (ERG) to whom she has been pandering throughout the leadership contest. This exposes Truss to an important dilemma regarding Brexit: She needs to show to her Brexiter base that she will not ‘undo’ the hard Brexit Johnson has imposed on the country, while at the same time finding ways in which Brexit can be made to work, given that a majority of voters currently think it is not. The two goals seem inherently incompatible, which means she will have to disappoint one side or the other, making her authority wobbly from the start.
Mounting Brexiter anxiety
This situation has led to considerable anxiety amongst Brexiters who consider Brexit to be at risk of being cancelled. Thus, Allister Heath recently penned a remarkable piece in the Telegraph, which illustrates how Brexiter discursive strategy continues to evolve now that they realise there is no real-world evidence supporting their case and the window of opportunity to convince voters of the contrary is slowly closing. The strategy revealed in Heath’s article hinges on rejecting ‘Remainers’ arguments simply based on a statement that they are ‘dishonest,’ or made in ‘bad faith,’ without providing a shred of evidence for those claims. Thus, Heath is upset about ‘Remainers’ pointing out that we were promised falling prices and real wage increases but are getting unparalleled inflation and a squeeze on disposable income that will push millions into poverty. To him, it is unfair to point out the discrepancy between Brexiters’ confident predictions and reality, because the argument is made in ‘bad faith’ and ‘out of context.’ Except that when we were promised a ‘no-downsides Brexit’ we were not told that depending on the context it might turn into a disaster. Similarly, when Johnson decided to turn Brexit-related labour shortages into a promise of wage rises, we were not told that depending on context that plan may change. It was Brexit that was oversold, not the warnings against it.
Heath goes on to defend Brexit by listing all the things that are going badly but should not be blamed on Brexit. The list includes the NHS crisis, Channel crossings, and water pollution. On each one of them we can – indeed should – have a debate about the extent to which Brexit has contributed to the problem. But even if we accepted Heath’s premise that Brexit is not to blame, the point is this: If all these bad things should not be blamed on Brexit, where are all the good things that Brexiters can take credit for? Brexiters will immediately jump out of their seats and shout in unison: ‘Vaccine roll out!’ That claim of a faster vaccine roll out thanks to the Brexit vote has been debunked many times (e.g. here and here). Even Heath – although claiming it as a Brexit benefit – acknowledges that we could have adopted the exact same vaccine strategy as an EU member. In fact, for all intents and purposes we still were an EU member when the vaccine purchase, approval and initial roll out took place, given that the transition period only ended in January 2021. So, his argument has to take another twisted turn, claiming that ‘psychologically’ the UK government would not have chosen that path without the Brexit vote. That argument is not convincing either given that successive UK governments never hesitated to ask for and get special treatment as an EU member (e.g. the UK rebate and the many opt-outs). Indeed, as my colleague Prof Helen Drake puts it “[t]he UK was for 46 years a semi-detached, awkward partner with a special deal.”
Still, for Heath, attacks on Brexit are unfair, downsides not Brexit’s fault, and upsides ignored by Remainers. So, clearly once all these ‘Remoaner’ falsehoods rejected, it becomes clear that Brexit is a success? That’s where the pile of falsehoods Heath has constructed falls apart and reveals the truth: By his own admission, it is not. How else do we explain that he is forced to talk about the “staggering implementation failures” that have prevented Brexit from developing positive effects? This is where the second part of the strategy kicks in: blaming everyone else for the failure Brexit is turning out to be. Here, he refers to “vindictive European protectionists” while other Brexiters have started blaming Theresa May now that the blame cannot be laid at the feet of a ‘Remainer Parliament.’
The problem is not that Heath is questioning whether some of the ills afflicting the country are due to Brexit – these are important debates to have. The problem is that he rejects arguments that say they are based on the claim that people making them are equally dishonest, ideologically motivated, and driven by sinister private motives. Brexiters see any criticism of Brexit as a conspiracy that hides some sinister motives. That reveals probably more about his own worldview than about people who are critical of Brexit.
For a Brexiter like Heath, no good can ever come from the EU and Euroscepticism must therefore remain the lodestar for British governments even after Brexit. That in turn leads to some very unorthodox policy views. He claims we need to focus on free trade with non-hostile countries, implying – just like Truss did last week – that EU member states are hostile countries. He also reiterates the imbecility that they UK should follow a “Singapore-style” model (although on one aspect of that plan the Tories are making good progress, namely turning the UK’s democracy into an autocracy just like Singapore). Another folly Heath suggests is to reduce our reliance on French ports. The question here, of course is: how? By moving the UK further into the Atlantic to bring it closer to the Americas? To maintain his baseless claims, he also has to resort to virulent anti-intellectualism, decrying the most sophisticated econometric methods we have to assess the impact of Brexit as “absurd forecasts or dodgy model-based ‘counterfactuals’” (presumably referring to the excellent econometric work done by Douch, Edwards, and Soegaard), or claiming that “[i]t makes little sense to compare energy price rises, as some countries are fixing prices (and subsidising firms) and others are not (and subsidising consumers, as we have so far).” Of course, it makes a whole lot of sense to compare them precisely because it informs us about how different policies work in the current context.
Heath sees Brexiter government no. 3 as the last chance saloon for his preferred kind of Brexit. Based on what we know about Truss’s policies and economics, he may not be disappointed.
Trussonomics: A new economic plan
Truss’s economics are particularly intriguing. She proposes a peculiar mix of tax cuts and increased spending, financed through increase borrowing in the short run, with the aim of generating enough economic growth to be able to rebalance debt-to-GDP in the long-run. This economic strategy makes many economists nervous as it breaks with some of the neoclassical dogmas of the past decades, most importantly the need to balance the public budget and reduce public debt. In an excellent article the Spectator’s economic editor Kate Andrews shows that Trussonomics is inspired by three rather controversial pro-Brexit economists, Patrick Minford, Julian Jessop, and Gerard Lyons, all of whom defend rather unorthodox libertarian views of the economy.
Breaking with past dogmas is of course not necessarily a bad thing. The obsession with balanced budgets while neglecting the impact of cuts to public spending to get there certainly should not be beyond doubt. Similarly, central bank independence has come to be seen as an unquestionable element of modern economic policy making. There certainly is room to consider whether that dogma should be challenged.
Yet, in terms of economics too Brexiters seem to lack a sense of realism and substance. Indeed, one get the feeling that Trussonomics currently is more of a campaign slogan than a well-thought through economic strategy. She seems to be trying to square the circle by promising big spending on infrastructure projects, pensions, etc., while cutting taxes, spurring growth, and getting a grip on inflation. This seems like wishful thinking and the Truss camp seems aware that there may be some nervousness about the unusual policy mix. Business secretary Kwasi Kwarteng – a Truss supported tipped to become Chancellor – took to the pages of the Financial Times to evidently try and reassure investors and markets of the soundness of Trussonomics.
Yet, under all the talk about ‘dogma busting’ and ‘unorthodox’ new ways of running the economy, Trussonomics seems to boil down to old, discredited laissez faire ideas. Thus, the heart of Truss’s economic strategy is tax cuts, which she justifies in ways reminiscent of 1980s Thatcherism and Reaganomics. When asked by Laura Kuenssberg whether her planned tax cuts – which are expected to benefit the poorer strata of society much less than the richer ones – were fair, she answered without hesitation that they were. That libertarian argument is usually based on a meritocratic myth that if someone is rich it has got to be because they deserve it. Beyond that myth, the rationale informing that tax strategy is the old idea that wealth will eventually ‘trickle down’ to poorer people thanks to investments made by the rich and resulting in economic growth. That approach is not a new unorthodox one, but good old-fashioned trickle-down economics. The approach has been rejected already back in 2015 by no other than the International Monetary Fund – previously one of its staunchest advocates – observing that rather than producing generalised wealth, it invariably led to increased inequality.
Unperturbed by that reality, our likely new Chancellor tries to sell those recipes from the 1980s as a new, bold approach to the economy which tackles head on ‘old managerialism’ that allegedly brought us low growth and productivity. What exactly ‘old managerialism’ in the context of macroeconomic policies is, remains entirely unclear. Equally remarkable and parochial is the fact that the plan seems to be growth at any price, with the environment and climate change not even earning a single mention. In economic terms, Brexit government no. 3 seems to be doubling down on the objective of behaving as if it still was the 1950s.
Reality
Despite all the wishful thinking and Brexiters’ inability to be truthful, reality is not going away. Regarding the most contentious issue opposing Brexit Britain and the EU – the Northern Ireland Protocol and especially the new NIP bill (NIPB) which Truss is expected to try and push through Parliament – for instance, what Brexiters see as vindicative EU punishment is from the EU perspective a reaction to a provocation undermining the EU’s prestige and credibility. That perception by the EU is a reality. Yet, Truss – and her Brexiter backers – do not seem able to accept it. They continue to see the NIPB as a tool to force the EU into negotiating a new deal, possibly combined with triggering Art. 16. Yet, for EU observers it seems clear that from the EU’s perspective a pre-condition for any negotiations is that the threat of the NIPB be removed. Here, the weakness of Brexit government no. 3 makes the UK’s negotiating position weaker still. Given the weak support Truss has in her own party and in the general population and given that a GE needs to take place by 2024, the EU may consider that waiting for the Truss government to implode and then establish a more productive relationship with the successor government may be a preferable option to dealing with the hard-core Brexiter Truss government.
Johnson’s legacy – The Partygate inquiry
Johnson himself has spent his last days in office touring the country trying to convince people that he is leaving a ‘legacy’ to be proud of. The obvious reason for this seems to be his wish to return to power sooner rather than later (e.g. in case the Tories lose the next GE and will look for a leader who can win elections). One stumbling block on the way back to Downing Street is the ongoing inquiry by the House Committee of Privileges into the Partygate scandal. Specifically, the committee is investigating whether the PM has committed a contempt of Parliament by – knowingly or unknowingly – providing false information about the Downing Street lockdown parties to the House of Commons. If Johnson were to be found in contempt of Parliament and censured, a return to front-bench politics would be difficult even in the eyes of the Telegraph. Therefore, the stakes are high for the outgoing PM, which certainly explains why he has sought legal advice and used the official government web page to publish the legal opinion of his lawyers as if it had some official status.
There have been several useful analyses and comments by legal experts on the form and substance of the opinion (e.g. here, here, and here). In terms of its political meaning, it constitutes another example of how the post-truth turn of the Tory party since the Brexit referendum leads to ever new strategies aimed at undermining British democracy.
One question the opinion raises is whether there can be contempt if the misleading of Parliament was unintentional. Here, the lawyers’ claim that for contempt to be present requires that the misleading of parliament was intentional, distracts from the fact that even if Johnson’s misleading of Parliament was not intentional, the Ministerial Code demands that ministers must correct at the earliest convenience any ‘inadvertent error’. In the case of Partygate Johnson has not done that. So, the discussion about intent is a red herring.
The opinion also questions the fairness of the procedure used by the Committee of Privileges, suggesting that Johnson is not getting a fair trial. According to Prof. Mark Elliott this claim is based on Johnson’s lawyers comparing the procedure adopted by the Committee to the procedure expected from a public body subject to judicial review. Yet, what the lawyers ignore is that it is a fundamental constitutional principle in the UK – related to the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty – that parliamentary committees are precisely not subject to judicial review by courts. That is what David Allen Green sees as the key weakness of the opinion: the ‘but for’ argument. But for the fact that we are dealing with a matter of Parliamentary privilege, a court would rule the procedure leading to the report unlawful. That is of course an absurd argument that negates the basic constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, that Brexiters claim to hold so high. Indeed, Prof. Elliott notes the irony in Johnson starting his Premiership rejecting the Supreme Court’s competence to rule on his proroguing of Parliament, while now hiring lawyers to argue that Parliament should behave as if being subject to legal review.
Regardless of its baselessness, what the opinion does achieve, is creating another myth of a Remainer plot against Brexit, like the theories around the Benn Act for instance. By questioning the legitimacy of the Committee’s procedure and hence any findings it will publish, the scene is set for claiming that a conspiracy has robbed Johnson from running again for Tory leadership and hence possibly PM. No doubt, Remainers will be blamed for it, even though the House of course still is firmly in conservative hands. This is not unlike the Trumpian propaganda against the legitimacy of the 2020 election in the US. The overall effect is to push the country further down the post-truth route, onto territory where it becomes increasingly difficult for citizens to tell reality from fiction.
Post-Truth Brexit and the eternal blame game
Brexit has always been fundamentally and inherently a post-truth project. It is based on promises that simply cannot be fulfilled. It is based on an analysis of issues that is deeply flawed to begin with and therefore relies on remedies that will not work. Therefore, the Brexit movement is stuck in its tangled web of lies – as Chris Grey noted a few months ago – and it cannot be extracted from them. In fact, Brexit is not entangled in lies, it is made of lies.
As the promises fall by the wayside one by one, what is there left for Brexiters to do? As people start asking questions about Brexit and start thinking it may have been a bad idea, what Brexiters have started doing is engaging in a post-truth blame game. On the one hand they argue that the problem is not Brexit but its ‘implementation.’ Or a slight variant of that argument: what we voted for was Brexit, what we got was Brexit in name only, a ‘Remainers Brexit’ etc. The latter regardless of the fact that the hard pro-Brexit right has been in charge of the Tory party at least since December 2019 and Johnson’s Brexit is more or less as hard as it can get. On the other hand, the reason that Brexit has not yielded any benefits is attributed to the vindicative EU who punishes Britain for leaving.
Both are excellent rhetorical devices and discursive strategies, which are so fundamentally post-truth that they cannot be falsified. The former measures ‘actually existing Brexit’ against an ideal counterfactual that will never exist and hence that we will never be able to judge based on any real-world evidence. The latter strategy allows any observe to construes any behaviour by European politicians as driven by a desire to punish the UK, which – of course – is equally unfalsifiable, as it is simply based on an assumption of bad faith while rejecting other countries right to make sovereign decisions about what they deem to be their own best interest.
Those who are still waiting for Brexiters to hold up their hands and admit that they may have been wrong are waiting in vain. Brexiters are psychologically, ideologically, and politically too committed to the project to ever take any responsibility for its consequences. They cannot be honest about Brexit, because it would undermine the basis most of them built their career on. Therefore, the next stage of the Brexit movement is entering into an eternal blame game where everyone else is responsible for the negative consequences of Brexit.
The way in which the country will finally move out of the Brexit mess it is currently stuck in is necessarily through a generational change. Only once political actors emerge on the scene who did not build their career on Euroscepticism or stake their reputation on the success of Brexit will we be able to talk about Brexit as a policy problem, rather than a question of quasi-religious faith. Only then will pragmatism re-enter UK politics and will it become possible to discuss real solutions to the many problems we are facing – many of them caused (NIP) or aggravated (inflation, labour shortages) by Brexit. For now, we will be stuck with another – even more extreme – Brexiter government whose main goal will be to deny reality. The best we can hope for is that it will not last for too long.
* I came up with the figure of 0.43% in the following way: The number of people on the electoral register for Parliamentary elections as of December 2021 was 46,560,452. It is estimated that conservative party membership stands around 200,000, although no exact figures are publicly available. This corresponds with 0.43% of the electorate. Since my initial post, however, the Tory party has announced that Liz Truss received 81,236 votes and Rishi Sunak 60,399. That corresponds with 0.17% of the electorate who voted for the current PM.